

The  
Anglo  
Gorkha  
War  
1814-1816

*Netra Rajya Laxmi Rana*

**The Anglo-Gorkha War**  
**(1814-1816)**

**By**

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*Publisher*

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## PREFACE

To understand the history and other issues of a country it is essential to look into its geographical situation. Due to the peculiar geographical position and the difficult means of communication Nepal remained more or less concealed from the outside world for several centuries and hence her history was not known to many of the foreigners till very recently. The actual writing of Nepal's History was started not by the Nepalese but by foreigners. Only one-sided view of Nepal was given by foreigners. Even when the Nepalese tried to redress the imbalance they lacked an historical approach. The result was that mere legends and story books appeared and this gave an idea to the Western scholars that the Hindus had no interest in writing History.

At present there are a few books which have been written by scholars like D. R. Regmi, B. D. Sanwal, K. C. Chaudhuri, Asad Husain, B. Majumdar, Bal Chandra Sharma and others. They have discussed some of the problems of the Nepalese history in a better perspective, but, there are many more corners which require special light and attention. One such corner of our history is the period of Anglo-Nepalese Relations.

In the present work an attempt has been made to discuss critically the problems of the Anglo-Nepalese War. Some of the secret documents and intercepted letters which could not be discovered and utilised by the former writers have been scientifically examined and apt conclusions drawn from them.

This thesis contains five chapters. In the first chapter an attempt has been made to give an introduction to the Anglo-Nepalese relations from the very beginning

to the outbreak of the war. The second chapter discusses various causes responsible for the war. Critical examination of the existing views of the scholars has also been made. It has been seen that the English wanted to have an easy access to Nepal whereas it was never desired by the Nepalese. So, the war was inevitable. The third chapter deals with the important events of the war. There the causes of the Nepalese defeat have also been carefully analysed.

Various attempts made by both the parties to come to a peaceful settlement is the subject-matter of the fourth chapter. The last chapter contains a reading of the effects of the Treaty of Sugauli and other conclusions.

This work has been revised and a few more new materials have been added to it. In this connection Elles, Brevet Major E. R.'s "Confidential Report on Nepal" is to be well remembered.

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1970.

**Netra Rajya Laxmi Rana**

## Abbreviations

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## INTRODUCTION

Nepal had been merely a geographical expression up to the middle of the 18th century. Today it covers an area of 54,362 square miles,<sup>1</sup> stretching from the Mahakali in the West to the Mechi in the East and from the borders of Chinese Tibet in the North to the frontiers of the Indian States of West Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in the South<sup>2</sup>. Up to the middle of the 18th century it was divided into a number of petty states. Their ruling chiefs always engaged themselves in quarrels. Jealousies, intrigues and conspiracies were the order of the day.

Gorkha was one of the petty states of Nepal where Prithibi Narayan Shah was born to Nara Bhupal Shah by Maharani Kaushalyavati<sup>3</sup> in January 1722.<sup>4</sup> From his boyhood Prithibi Narayan Shah was very ambitious and active. A good rider, Prithibi Narayan Shah was adept in the use of various types of arms.<sup>5</sup> His knowledge and experience of men and affairs of Nepal and the adjoining countries were wide and deep. His deep wisdom, original thinking and supreme statesmanship has left an indelible impression on the Nepalese mind. A great statesman as he was, he realised the important points of weaknesses of his country and emphasised that divided Nepal could not exist for long. The unification of the country was not only desirable but also very essential for its survival. So after ascending the throne of Gorkha, he aimed at the political unification of the country by means of diplomacy and conquest.

Quite sanguine of success, he reorganised his army in the best possible way and formed non-aggression pact with some of the chiefs of his time. He established friendly ties with the rulers of Kaski, Tanahu and even with the chief of Lamjung with whom Gorkha rulers always had great animosity in the past.<sup>6</sup> Thus, reorganising his army he moved cautiously to work out his plans of conquest which would culminate in the cherished goal of political unification of Nepal. He turned his attention first of all towards Nuwakot which he conquered with great sacrifice.<sup>7</sup> The conquest of Nuwakot brought "the granary of the Kathmandu people" at his disposal.<sup>8</sup> Apart from this, he was in a position to control the highway leading to Kathmandu and the Indo-Tibetan trade which passed through Nuwakot.<sup>9</sup> Belkot, Naldum, Mahadev Pokhari, Dahachowk, Kirtipur and Mackwanpur were also conquered.<sup>10</sup> As Mackwanpur was in possession of a great portion of the Tarai its conquest by Prithibi Narayan Shah gave him the advantage of a very rich revenue.<sup>11</sup> Another advantage was that he could control the trade route to India.<sup>12</sup> For keeping proper watch on the Kathmandu valley the occupation of Mackwanpur was quite essential. The conquest of Mackwanpur gave him not only good revenue and control over the trade routes to India but also a large number of arms and ammunitions and elephants<sup>13</sup> which made his army more powerful. Then he attacked the Kathmandu valley which was divided into three states—Lalitpur, Kantipur and Bhaktapur.<sup>14</sup>

The conditions of Kathmandu valley, were favourable to Prithibi Narayan Shah. The three Valley Kings who came from different branches of the same Malla Family were always at war with one another. The word unity was an unknown factor to them. Jealousies and quarrels paved the way for the Gorkha conquest. In Patan the state was in chaos because the political power was the monopoly of the "six Pradhans"<sup>15</sup> who made and unmade the Kings. Vishnu Malla, the King of Lalitpur had no

son,<sup>16</sup> so he nominated Rajya Prakash as his successor<sup>17</sup> which, as a matter of fact, worsened the relation of Lalitpur with Jaya Prakash Malla, the King of Kantipur. Later on the Pradhans cruelly dethroned Rajya Prakash. The King of Bhaktapur, Ranajit Malla, suspected no hostility from Prithibi Narayan Shah as the former was the god-father<sup>18</sup> of the latter.

Now let us take up the case of Kantipur which was being ruled by Jaya Prakash Malla. Before he ascended the throne the courtiers had opposed his right and wanted to make his younger brother, Rajya Prakash the King.<sup>19</sup> The plot of the courtiers, to make Rajya Prakash the King, however, failed<sup>20</sup> and Jaya Prakash Malla continued to be the King of Kantipur. Humiliated and enraged, the courtiers, in a spirit of revenge, announced his younger brother, Narendra Prakash, as the King of some parts of Kantipur, including Deupatan.<sup>21</sup> But Jaya Prakash took the challenge. The trouble, however, did not come to an end. His own wife revolted against him, and he was ousted and replaced by his baby son, Jyoti Prakash.<sup>22</sup> Thus these facts reveal that Jaya Prakash had very bad relation even with the members of his family. Besides, some of his army officers were also against him.<sup>23</sup> Finding himself helpless he had other alternative than to seek the help of the English against Prithibi Narayan Shah. Due to the above mentioned political condition of the Valley, Prithibi Narayan Shah was able to conquer and annex these Kingdoms one after another.

At a time when Prithibi Narayan Shah was pursuing the policy of conquest and expansion the East India Company also was doing the same in Bengal and other parts of India. The Battle of Plassey of 1757 established British hegemony over Bengal and the Battle of Buxar created an opportunity for the English to interfere in the affairs of the whole of the Northern India. Thus, having acquired enough strength and territories, the two expansionist forces were to meet on the common border of

the Tarai.<sup>24</sup> Till the Malla period the only relation which Nepal had with India had been the trade relation. But this trade relation was hampered when Prithibi Narayan Shah blockaded Nepal. So, when Jaya Prakash Malla sought the help of the English against Prithibi Narayan Shah in 1767, the English sent an expedition under Captain Kinloch.<sup>25</sup> The English had sent this expedition so that if Jaya Prakash Malla turned out to be victorious they would be able to get the facility of an opening of communication with China<sup>26</sup> through Nepal. The ultimate result would be of great advantage of the Company because it would have control over the forests that would help in furthering the cause of fir schemes.<sup>27</sup> Besides, it would have the safety of the revenue of Bettiah.<sup>28</sup> It would have all these advantages without spending a single pie in the fight as Jaya Prakash Malla was willing to bear all costs of the expedition.<sup>29</sup> Besides this, the Nepal Government would remain on its side and hence there would be no danger to the British territory of India from Nepal. The causes of the failure of this expedition are mainly four. Firstly, too much confidence was placed on the unreliable information of the Nepalese Vakeels.<sup>30</sup> Secondly, Mr. Rumbold, the Chief of Patna and Capt. Kinloch in a hurry overlooked the extremely hazardous nature of the journey.<sup>31</sup> Thirdly, the troops which had been sent were hopelessly inadequate, and the strength and the fighting capacity of the Gorkhas<sup>32</sup> had been under estimated. Lastly, they did not care to consult the Commander-in-Chief for his advice in sending the expedition due to their over confidence.<sup>33</sup> "Nature fought for the Gorkhas". The bridge and the raft that were made for crossing the river Bagmati were washed down before the army could cross over.<sup>34</sup> The result was that the hope of conquering the Kathmandu Valley was given up.

At a time when Jaya Prakash Malla had sent his messenger to the English to seek help Prithibi Narayan Shah was intelligent enough and could not keep himself idle. He also tried to win the sympathy of the

Company but the latter did not comply with the proposal and tried to help the weaker party.<sup>35</sup> When the English took this attitude towards Prithibi Narayan Shah it was but natural on his part to expel the “Firangies” from the Nepalese soil and to cultivate unfriendly attitude towards the English.<sup>36</sup> In the meantime the English were still trying their best to established relation with Nepal. James Logan<sup>37</sup> who, knew the topography and the political situation of the Tarai and Nepal, came forward and was willing to be appointed an emissary to Nepal. The English wanted to establish friendly relation externally but internally it was the trade facilities and the full information about Nepal that they wanted. But this Logan Mission also proved to be a failure. He was most probably driven out of Nepal. Although the first two attempts of the English to capture the trade of Kathmandu Valley failed yet they did not give up the idea of establishing their trade mart in Nepal. They were to make other plans and wait for the right opportunity when they would be able to achieve success in this respect.

Prithibi Narayan Shah was succeeded by his son Pratap Singha Shah, who had a very short reign of about three years.<sup>38</sup> Although some areas in the West as well as in the East were annexed to Nepal he was not much interested in the warlike activities. He devoted himself to religion and wrote a book on Tantrik philosophy.<sup>39</sup> Thus, he proved himself incapable of finishing the great task of his father who was always aiming at the expansion of the Gorkha territory so that it might become invincible.

Rana Bahadur Shah, an infant of three years, succeed his father, Pratap Singha in 1718.<sup>40</sup> As Rana Bahadur Shah was “an infant in arms” Regency was for some time placed in the hands of his mother, Queen Rajendra Laxmi.<sup>41</sup> The infant King’s uncle, Bahadur Shah, who had been exiled to Bettiah for his clashes with Pratap Singh Shah in the latter’s reign, also returned to Kathmandu.<sup>42</sup> Bettiah was a place where the refugees from Nepal generally stayed and was also the head-quarters of a Chris-

tian Mission which also gave advice to the exiles if the latter so desired.<sup>43</sup> It is found that some important Nepalese like Dalamardan Shah had conspired against the government of Pratap Singha Shah and intended to get the co-operation of Bahadur Shah so that they might be able to induce the English to offer them help. It is, however, not clear whether Bahadur Shah joined them or not. But before the plan matured Pratap Singha died and on hearing the news of the death of his brother, Bahadur Shah came back to Kathmandu.<sup>44</sup>

Queen Mother Rajendra Laxmi and Bahadur Shah could not pull on well. At the beginning Rajendra Laxmi found in Bahadur Shah a tactful and capable man who could be her confidant but later on she started fearing him and wanted to get rid of him. She realised what sort of a man Bahadur Shah was. From the time of Prithibi Narayan Shah, Bahadur Shah had been constantly favouring the English. Thus, it is found that Bahadur Shah went against his father's policy. It is probable that he had this attitude because he realised that he would not get the throne as he was not the heir-apparent. Bahadur Shah might have thought that he would get the throne if he could win the English support. So he supported the foreigners whom his father had driven out from Nepal and became friendly with them. Materials clearly reveal that when Bahadur Shah assumed the Regency of Rana Bahadur Shah he started sending presents to the Capuchin monks in Bettiah.<sup>45</sup> That Bahadur Shah was friendly towards the English is further confirmed by Maulvi Abdul Qadir's report in which the latter stated:- "Bahadur Shah, the **Rajah's** uncle, a man of great sense, who annexed to Nepal the possessions of several **Rajhas** and listened to the advice of men of knowledge and was in his heart disposed to cultivate friendship of the Company....."<sup>46</sup>

When the hill Kings found that there was friction between the Queen Mother Rajendra Laxmi and Bahadur Shah in the court of Nepal they started hostile

activities against the Gorkha King. But Rajendra Laxmi was able to have the upper hand and when she assumed the Regency, Bahadur Shah was again exiled to Bettiah.<sup>47</sup> During the period of her Regency, Rajendra Laxmi was successful in conquering Kaski, Lamjung, Gurungkot and Nuwakot.<sup>48</sup> She, thus, tried to fulfil the wishes of her father-in-law by uniting Nepal.

After the death of Rajendra Laxmi in 1786 Bahadur Shah returned to Nepal and became the Regent. Bahadur Shah apprehended danger from Palpa side. so he managed to have matrimonial relation with the King of Palpa by marrying his daughter.<sup>49</sup> It was a stroke of diplomacy on his part to turn it into a friendly state.<sup>50</sup>

Finding Nepal safe from Palpa side he engaged himself in expanding Nepal towards the West and was successful in conquering Gulmi, Argha, Dailekh, Aacham, Doti, Dhauri, Gagauli, Liglig, Almoda and Alaknanda.<sup>51</sup> The Nepalese troops had advanced as far as Srinagar. the capital of Garhwal.<sup>52</sup>

Before the conquests in the West were completed Bahadur Shah was engaged in the war with Tibet. When the Chinese came to the help of the Tibetans and advanced as far as Dhaibung, Bahadur Shah thought it wise to make peace with China.<sup>53</sup> Further clashes were avoided by coming to the terms of a treaty which was signed in 1792 in Nuwakot.

Bahadur Shah had tried his best to get the help from the English against the Chinese although his father Prithibi Narayan Shah had left behind him clear instructions in his "Dibhya Upadesh"<sup>54</sup> that Chinese friendship should be courted and one should be very cautious in making friendship with an imperialist nation like the English as it had been constantly aggressive towards the neighbouring states of India. In spite of his great efforts he could not succeed in getting help from the East India Company against the Chinese. Lord Cornwallis, the then Governor-General

refused to assist Nepal against the Chinese probably because of the fear of the emergence of Nepal as a stronger power after the victory was achieved with the British help. A strong nation at the neighbourhood, he would never have cherished. The English, however, were clever enough not to lose the opportunity for getting a foothold in Nepal and thus reaching the cherished goal. Such an opportunity could not be always got. The English decided to send military mission under the leadership of Colonel William Kirkpatrick in 1793.<sup>55</sup> The real intention of the mission was to study the condition of the war. But as the Nepalese had already concluded the treaty with the Chinese in 1792, before the arrival of the Kirkpatrick Mission in Nepal, it was not much cared by the Nepalese and so it had to return without achieving anything there.<sup>56</sup>

With the idea of getting help in the war between Tibet and Nepal and especially to strengthen his own position, Bahadur Shah signed a commercial treaty with the East India Company in 1792.<sup>57</sup> For the signing of this commercial treaty a mission under the leadership of Abdul Qadir Khan came to Nepal and the "Nepalese Government agreed to accept the proposition put up before them through Abdul Qadir."<sup>58</sup> But the signing of this commercial treaty also did not help and the English too did not send assistance to the Nepalese. Instead Col. Kirkpatrick Mission visited Nepal. Guru Gajraj Misra, the Raj Guru and courtier, played an important part<sup>59</sup> in the signing of this Commercial Treaty of 1792. The ultimate result of this Commercial Treaty of 1792 was that it did not bring any fruit except that Kirkpatrick "rendered a valuable service to the East India Company" by unvelling the history of Nepal and making the topographical, military, political and commercial knowledge of Nepal known to the Europeans.<sup>60</sup>

The failure of Kirkpatrick Mission was followed by the mission of Maulvi Abdul Qadir. The English became fully aware that the Nepalese rulers looked upon the English merchants as aggressors;

so it was thought that Abdul Qadir would be the proper man to be sent to Nepal. They contemplated that his trip to Nepal in 1792 would lead to less suspicion. Besides, he had some idea of Nepal and her people. Due to the above mentioned facts, Sir John Shore, the then Governor-General, deputed Maulvi Abdul Qadir Khan to the court of Nepal. Special instruction was given that the "Maulvi was to consider himself as a merchant and not as an agent of Government."<sup>61</sup> The main purpose of this mission was supposed to be the betterment of the trade relationship between two countries. Indirectly, the Maulvi was also instructed to settle the question of the boundary dispute between Morung and Purnea.<sup>62</sup> Apart from this he was to endeavour to solve the problem of the Faquir and Sannyasi menace which occasionally committed outrages in the Company's territories and had settled in Morung.<sup>63</sup> These facts clearly indicate that outwardly Maulvi's Mission was for strengthening the trade relation between the two countries but inwardly it had to serve political interest too.

But before the departure of the Maulvi Qadir Mission the English Resident at Benaras received a letter from the Nepalese King in which the latter discouraged the visit of the trade mission on the ground that after the war with the Chinese there were no good signs of the prosperity of trade. The King further wrote that he did not think it advisable for the Company to send trade mission as it would incur losses to the English.<sup>64</sup> In reply to this letter the Governor-General made a request to the Nepalese **Rajha** to punish a body of "freebooting **fakers**" under Karim Shah and Soobhna Ali Shah who often made incursion and also informed the Governor-General that he had despatched two companies of **Tillingas** to drive them and added that the Company should also take reciprocally the same sort of steps against Gudjaree Roy and other robbers who had taken shelter in Purnea, the Company's territory, and often made incursions in the Nepalese soil of Morung.<sup>65</sup>

As a matter of fact the real motive of the Nepalese King to stop the Qadir Mission was that "he wanted to compel attention of the Company to the long outstanding question of adjustment of the boundaries between Bengal and Morung."<sup>66</sup> "Secondly, the Nepal Government suspected that the Company was not inclined to forward the cause of the **Rajah** in respect of Cashipur and Rudrapoor the two districts in the Nawab Vazier's country and of which he had claimed possession."<sup>67</sup> "Thirdly, the **Rajha's Dewan**, Deenanath Upadhaya held the monopoly of the Nepalese trade with Bengal and just before the despatch of the **Rajha's** letter Deenanath arrived at Nepal and brought his personal influence to bear upon the **Rajha** to write discouraging the sending of the commercial embassy."<sup>68</sup>

The Nepalese **Rajha's Guru**, Gajraj Misra, "a dependable friend of the Company"<sup>69</sup> was sent to the Nepalese court to persuade the King to allow the Maulvi Mission to visit Nepal and Gajraj Misra was successful in his mission and was able to procure an invitation from the Nepalese King to Maulvi Abdul Qadir to visit Nepal.<sup>70</sup> The Maulvi Mission visited Nepal with the following assignments; (1) "to pay respects to you" (2) "to transmit the presents intended for you by the Governor-General" (3) "to transmit the **Khellaut** and letters from the Nawab Vizier," (4) "to communicate with you in respect to settling the boundary between Morung and Purnea which you are so desirous of," (5) "to converse with you on the subject Cashipoor and Rudrapoor for which you formely made application in the manner the Governor-General had authorised and on the endeavours which out of consideration for your attachment are made for the purpose and as the Khan had with some specimens of his goods which he proposed to trade with on his own account, and as friendship and candor (sic) it is necessary to inform you of this and application also made by the Khaun to the Governor-General for a recommendation on that account, the

Governor-General out of consideration for the union subsisting between the two states may have written to you by way of recommending him.”<sup>71</sup>

Finally, the Maulvi arrived at Kathmandu with his party and merchandise in 1795 and he was received with all due courtesy needed to a foreign emissary by the **Rajha's Dewan**.<sup>72</sup> The Maulvi offered him the presents on behalf of the Governor-General. In acknowledgement of the receipt of the presents the **Rajha** wrote to the Governor-General and also expressed his friendly sentiments and added—“I reckon any person who plunders or otherwise infests the Company's territory as an absolute enemy to my own country and please God I will continue to chastise such riotous persons.”<sup>73</sup>

The Governor-General wrote to the **Rajha** of Nepal of the decision of the question of the boundary between Morung and Purnea. The **Rajah** raised the question of Cashipoor and Rudrapoor, which actually belonged to the Nawab Vazier but the **Rajah** wanted to possess it “through the good office of the Governor-General, for the services rendered by the Gurkhas in the Rohilla War.”<sup>74</sup> Maulvi Abdul Qadir assured the King of the Company's great friendship and the King on hearing this desired that the matter be settled in favour of Nepal. Although the purpose of Maulvi's Mission was for furthering the cause of trade, it played an important part as a political mission. His timely reports to the Company clearly attest this view. The Maulvi, however, cautioned the Governor-General that some of the ministers like Damodar Pandey, Abhiman Singh, Bal Bhadra Shah and others were against the further Anglo-Nepalese trade relations.<sup>75</sup>

In spite of his best efforts to hide the real nature of the mission, the Maulvi was ultimately recognised in his true colours. The faithful courtiers began to feel that he was trying to study the weak points of the Nepalese court and was planning to help a revolution which would offer an opportunity to the Company to interfere in

the internal affairs of the country. Under such circumstances, it was thought fit that he should not be allowed to stay in Nepal for a long time. In reality, he was ousted from Nepal <sup>76</sup> and thus his mission proved a failure.

The Maulvi Abdul Qadir Mission returned from Nepal without achieving anything. Nepal's relations with the East India Company did not alter. As a matter of fact, the Nepalese still kept the English at a considerable distance.

In 1797 the death of the Nawab of Oudh occurred. Sa'adat Ali, the brother of the deceased became the Nawab instead of Wazir Ali who was looked upon by the deceased Nawab as his successor. Wazir Ali, who was considered to be an illegitimate son of Asaf Uddaulah, was given pension and he settled in Benaras. It is believed that Wazir Ali secretly moved against the English and also contacted Zaman Shah of Kabul. Mr. Cherry, the then Resident at Benaras, was instructed to escort him to Calcutta to stop his illegal actions. Enraged at this, Wazir Ali massacred many Englishmen including Mr. Cherry and fled to hills of the Tarai.<sup>77</sup>

After coming to know of this incident Rana Bahadur Shah wrote to the then Acting Governor-General, Sir Alured Clarke, and expressed his deep sorrow over the incident. He wrote to the Governor-General assuring that he would try his best to expel Wazir Ali from the Nepalese territory.<sup>78</sup> These facts show that the Nepalese King wanted to remain aloof in the Wazir Ali Case.

Soon after Wazir Ali affair was over Rana Bahadur Shah expressed his intention to the Governor-General that he wanted to abdicate his throne in favour of his son Girwan Yuddha Bickram Shah, from his third Maharani Kantimati. "The Governor-General was requested to direct his attention to whatever might conduce to the promotion of existing friendship which would be reciprocated by the new Rajah in an equal measure."<sup>79</sup> The abdication

of **Rana Bahadur** and the accession of **Girbana Yuddha Bickram Shah** took place towards the end of March 1799.<sup>80</sup>

**Rana Bahadur Shah** abdicated the throne in favour of **Girbana** for two main reasons. Firstly, he had been told by the astrologers that he would die at the age of 24<sup>81</sup> and secondly that he wanted to fulfil his promise to **Kantimati** that her son **Girban** would succeed him. He had the fear that the orthodox court would not like to put his beloved son on the throne after his death as the latter was not born of a lady belonging to his own caste. It was mainly because of this reason that he wanted to settle this problem in his own lifetime.<sup>82</sup>

**Rana Bahadur Shah** assumed the title of **Swami Nirbanananda** but still reserved in his own hands the supreme authority. After abdicating the throne **Swami Maharaja** lived in **Patan** as a **Sanyasi** and handed over the administration to a Council of Regency with **Jethi Maharaai Raj Rajeshwari** as the head & **Krishna Shah, Damodar Pandey, Kirtiman Basnet, Tribhuban Pradhan, Bal Bhadra Shah** and others as members.<sup>83</sup> **Kantimati** died in about November 1799, i.e., about eight months after the abdication.<sup>84</sup>

The death of **Kantimati** overwhelmed **Rana Bahadur Shah**, the **Swami Maharaja**, with grief and turned him mad for some time.<sup>85</sup> **Rana Bahadur's** madness gave the opportunity to **Damodar Pandey**, to usurp the power. The **Baby King, Girbana**, was taken to **Nuwakot** and the **Capital** was also shifted to **Nuwakot** for the time being. Not completely satisfied with the change of the capital, he plotted with the members of the Council to arrest and confine **Rana Bahadur Shah**. But some of the members of the Council who disagreed with him could not express their opinion before him. One of them, **Chautaria Bal Bhadra Shah** left **Nuwakot** at night for **Patan** and revealed the whole plot before **Swami Maharaja**. Preparations

were made for the Civil War but Rana Bahadur Shah all of a sudden changed his mind and started secretly for Benaras in 1800. When it was known, Bhim Sen Thapa, Bal Bhadra Shah, Bal Narsing, Guru Gajraj Misra and others followed the King. The Jethi Maharani, Raj Rajeshwari also left Nuwakot and accompanied the Swami Maharaja. This made it easier for Damodar Pandey to monopolise power. He heartily welcomed Rana Bahadur Shah's second Maharani Subarna Prabha as the new Regent and brought Girbana Bickram Shah back to Kathmandu Valley.<sup>86</sup>

In Benaras Swami Maharaja did not keep himself idle. He interested himself in intriguing mostly with the British authorities who had kept a close watch on him. The English too got the fine opportunity for furthering the cause of their political and commercial interest in Nepal. Lord Wellesley, the then Governor-General, appointed a person to attend upon Swami Maharaja with a view to enable the Company to avail themselves of a favourable opportunity if it arose. Captain Knox had already visited the Nepalese Court as a Lieutenant and Military Officer of the Kirkpatrick Mission in 1793. As he had acquired sufficient knowledge about the affairs of Nepal he was appointed by the Governor-General to attend upon Rana Bahadur Shah in Benaras.<sup>87</sup>

Although Rana Bahadur Shah tried to distract himself from the pleasures of the world he could not change his heart and mind. If the English evidences are to be believed he addicted himself to all sorts of vices and thus the 'Yogi' ultimately became the first class 'Bhogi.'<sup>88</sup>

As an ordinary man he had restrictions in getting all the necessary things for his pleasures. So he was becoming more and more inclined towards getting back the abdicated throne of Nepal. From Benaras he wrote a letter to the Governor-General requesting him for his re-establishment on the Nepalese throne.<sup>89</sup> The English were in search of such an opportunity for strengthen-

aining their influence in Nepal. But as they were shrewd politicians they did not like to do anything in haste and hence Captain Knox was given special instructions not to give assurances to Rana Bahadur immediately. The Governor-General wanted to act as a mediator between the **Swami Maharaja** and the Nepalese Court. Knox was ordered to receive proposals from Rana Bahadur and to start negotiations with the Nepalese court whether men in power were willing to re-admit Rana Bahadur under the guarantee of the British Government. If the Company was successful in acting as a mediator between the two parties it would have an upper hand in the political affairs of Nepal in future and it would also be able to secure more facilities for trade. What the Governor-General wanted to do was to act as a mediator and not as an intervener in the politics of Nepal directly.<sup>90</sup>

Even when Rana Bahadur Shah carried on negotiations with the English for seeking military help he was not oblivious of all the worries that Nepal would have to face with the rise of the English influence in the Valley. In order to keep them at a great distance from the politics of his country, he did not like to conceive the idea of making them mediators. When their intention of mediating between him and the Nepal Government became evident he wrote letters to some of his reliable officers that “the appetite of the English is insatiable.....Misser Gajraj is interested in the prosperity of the English and he will deceive you.....”<sup>91</sup> Rana Bahadur knew that the English wished to deceive the Nepalese so he warned the Nepalese court to be very careful about their desires. **Guru Gajraj** was also suspected of double-dealings and actually “he proved himself to be an unfailing friend of the English.”<sup>92</sup>

In the meantime Knox opened negotiations with the chief of the Nepalese Court and advised them to restore Rana Bahadur. From the Nepalese side Gajraj Misra was the negotiator. When Rana Bahadur

learnt about this direct negotiation between the English and the Nepalese Court he pressed the Company for military help and also wrote to the Governor-General that the Nepalese Courtiers were trying to replace his son by a nephew of Sri Kissen Shah. He further requested the Company to punish the Nepalese Chiefs and to restore him to the guardianship of his minor son. He was willing to bear all the military expenses needed for getting back the throne.<sup>93</sup> From various sources we get the information that he was not solely depending upon the English for restoring his glory. He was constantly negotiating with his well wishers in Nepal to create an atmosphere for his return without the English help.<sup>94</sup> He could ignore the Governor-General of India as the latter was badly engaged at that time in the affairs of the Marathas, the Sikhs and the French.<sup>95</sup> The English who always kept vigilance on his activities came to know of his intentions and secret plannings. They did not like to allow him to act freely. Knox was instructed to inform Rana Bahadur that he would not be permitted to leave the Company's territory unless the Governor-General so desired.<sup>96</sup> The fact remains that the English wanted to use the exiled **Rajah** as a means to extract some political and commercial concession from the ruling power in Nepal. To effect this, some **sepoys** were appointed in the name of **Rajah's** security. But, Rana Bahadur Shah was not a fool who could not understand their tactics. So like a very wise man and diplomat he wrote to the Governor-General to withdraw the **sepoys** as the Nepal Court had suspected he was being kept in confinement.

In the meantime efforts were being made for the conclusion of a treaty. Knox sent a draft of the treaty which the Company wanted to be signed by the two Governments. Gajraj Misra carried on negotiations with the chiefs of Nepal on the basis of that draft. The main features of the negotiations from the Company's side were, "(1) settlement of **Jageer** on the **ex-Rajah** adequate for a liberal maintenance; (2) establishment of an English

Resident at Nepal, and, (3) improved trade relations between the two States.” The Nepal Government was willing to sign the treaty of friendship with the Company but for “the establishment of an English Resident at Nepal.”<sup>98</sup> Finally, a treaty was concluded between the Nepalese and the Company. By this treaty (1) a **Zagir** was settled upon Rana Bahadur Shah, (2) a British Resident was established in Kathmandu and a Nepalese **Vakeel** was appointed at Calcutta. Bijayapur **Purganna** was settled as Rana Bahadur Shah’s **Zagir**. Conclusion of the Treaty of 1801 marked an important phase in the development of Anglo-Nepalese relations especially in commercial and political fields.

Captain Knox was appointed the first British Resident at Kathmandu according to the Treaty of 1801. He was given special instruction in the political, commercial, military and general fields. In the political field “Knox was to obtain every relevant information about the civil Government, its alliances and connections with other States specially with that of China.”<sup>99</sup> Knox was to make best efforts for establishing good relation between the East India Company and Nepal. Knox was also to obtain the knowledge of the strategic importance of the Nepalese territories in relation to those of the Nawab Vazier.<sup>100</sup>

In the capacity of a commercial head, Knox was to see that the Treaty of Commerce of 1792 was being completely effected. Besides he was to see that the commercial interest of the Company was promoted in other ways also.<sup>101</sup> This shows that great importance was attached by the East India Company to its relation with Nepal.

In the military field Knox was to be accurately informed of the military government of Nepal “such as the number types and discipline of its troops, its internal and external defences.” “The Governor-General also instructed Captain Knox that at a proper time he should sound the Nepal Government in respect of ceding a portion of the forest lands skirting the Company’s territories or of

money.”<sup>102</sup> Knox was to obtain all these informations without any suspicion on the part of the Nepal Government.

Meanwhile three young men, sons of Bum Shah, Damodar Pandey and Indra Bir, were sent to Patna as Vakeel to represent the Nepal Government in the Company's dominions. Actually these three young men were more or less hostages in order to strengthen the “footing of Captain Knox in Nepal.” Knox had also suggested to the Governor-General the granting of pensions from the Company Government to Damodar Pandey, Bum Shah and a few others in order to influence them.<sup>103</sup>

Captain Knox had been making efforts to have good relations with the **Rajah** of Butwal and Palpa as it was thought to be of great benefit to the commercial interests of the Company.<sup>104</sup> But it was not successful

Tribhuban Pradhan, one of the **Kazis**, was very much against the coming of the Knox Mission to Kathmandu with such a large suite. But **Guru Gajraj** was in favour of it.<sup>105</sup> Gradually the Treaty of 1801 began to be neglected.

The political condition of Nepal was very critical and Queen Raj Rajeshwari, who had accompanied **Swami Maharaja** to Benaras left Benaras for Kathmandu. She left for Nepal accompanied by Bal Bhadra Shah a few months before the arrival of Knox; but she had been prevented by the Regent **Rani**, Subarna Prabha from entering Nepal. Raj Rajeshwari was thus compelled to stay at a village named Katahar Ban on the frontier.<sup>106</sup>

In the Nepalese court, the Regent Queen's favourite, Kirti Man Basnet had been assassinated for which Damodar Pandey was suspected. But the latter proved himself innocent and so he resumed his office.<sup>107</sup>

In the meantime Raj Rajeshwari managed to enter Nepal without opposition and there she was received by Damodar Pandey. In fear Subarna Prabha fled to Deupatan taking the boy King with her. Raj Rajeshwari,

however, resumed the Regency and brought back the boy King to the Palace and confined Subarna Prabha.<sup>108</sup> Raj Rajeshwari assured Knox of her fullest co-operation after she would assume the Regency. She also informed him that she wanted to pay the debts to the Company.<sup>109</sup>

Damodar Pandey was unwilling to execute the orders of the **Rani** in this regard. When Knox realised that the terms of the Treaty of 1801 were being neglected he expressed through **Guru Gajraj** that he wanted to withdraw his mission from Nepal. But when the **Rani** received this message she tried to persuade him to stay on. But as he was fully convinced that his stay was useless and he left Nepal in 1803. At the request of the **Rani**, Abdul Ali Khan was left back in Kathmandu. Thus, the Treaty of 1801 was dissolved on January 24, 1804 and the Company's attempt to establish a British Resident at Kathmandu ended in a failure. But to the satisfaction of the Company, Knox was able to gather all other informations.<sup>110</sup>

The English did no longer impose restriction on Rana Bahadur Shah's movements. He returned to Nepal in 1804 and proved himself the most powerful man and exiled Queen Raj Rajeshwari to Helambu and ordered the execution of Damodar Pandey and his sons.<sup>111</sup> Bhim Sen Thapa became the Prime Minister<sup>112</sup> and Rana Bahadur Shah assumed the Regency of his son Girbana Youdha Bickram Shah. The failure of the Knox Mission left no other alternative to the English than to reach the cherished goal by means of making a display of their military superiority over Nepal.

*Foot Note:-*

1. Malla, pp. 1-2; Woodyatt, N. G., in his book, "History of the 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles 1815—1927," London, 1923, p. 1. write that Nepal "covers an area of some 54,000 miles with a population of about six millions."
2. Malla, pp. 1-2.
3. Sharma, p. 216.
4. Ibid.
5. Regmi, p. 45.
6. Ibid, p. 50.
7. Ibid, p. 54; Shah, p. 55.
8. Regmi, p. 55.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid, pp. 55--61.
11. Ibid, p. 61.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. p. 62
14. Sanwal, p. 40; Fraser, p. 5
15. Sanwal, p. 41; Forbes, p. 34.
16. Sanwal, p. 41.
17. Ibid.
18. Regmi, p. 52.
19. Sharma, p. 173.
20. Ibid p. 174.
21. Sanwal, p. 41; Sharma, p. 174; According to Sharma, Narendra Prakash was declared in Deupatan as the King of Sankhu, Changu, Gokarna, Nandigram and Deupatan.
22. Sanwal, p. 41; Forbes, p. 34 .
23. Sharma, pp. 174—177.
24. Chaudhuri, p. 5; Forbes, p. 46.
25. Chaudhuri, pp. 13—20.
26. Ibid, p. 14.
27. Ibid,

28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid, p. 19.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid, p. 20.
34. Ibid p. 23.
35. Ibid, p. 14.
36. Ibid p. 32; NAW, p. 7 .
37. Chaudhuri, p. 34.
38. Landon, p. 67. There is a controversy about his name but according to ISP his name is Pratap Singha Shah and not Singha Pratap Shah (p. 157).
39. Aryal, I. R., **Naya Nepal Ko Itihas**, p. 109.
40. Regmi, p. 104; Landon (p. 67), however gives 1775 as the date of the accession of Rana Bahadur Shah. But this date does not seem to be convincing; Jain, p. 4; Even Hamilton gives the date 1775 (p. 246)
41. Sharma, p. 235.
42. Regmi, p. 106.
43. Ibid, p. 105.
44. Ibid, pp. 105—106.
45. RBS, p. 4.
46. Chaudhuri, p. 92.
47. Regmi, p. 108 .
48. Ibid, pp. 108– 109.
49. Ibid, p. 109.
50. RBS, p. 7.
51. Ibid, pp. 7—8.
52. Ibid, p. 8.
53. Ibid, pp. 9—11; IPSP, pp. 55—56 121; Forbes (p. 41), notes that “every ten years Katmandu would send tribute to Pekin.”
54. RBS, p. 15.
55. Ibid, p. 11; Jain, p. 4; Northey, W. B. and Morris C.J. in their book, “The Gurkhas” London, 1928, p. 42, writes that the Kirkpatrick Mission visited

Nepal on the 1st March, 1793.

56. Smith, Vol. 1., pp. 162–163. Smith remarks:– But although the envoy lost no time in repairing to Patna, from whence he was to be conducted by a deputation to be sent thither for the purpose, from Nepal (sic), he found at his arrival at the former place, that the Regency either dubious of the efficacy of our interposition with the Chinese or fearful of the influence which, if successful, it might give us in their future councils, or, possibly, really intimidated by the menacing attitude of the enemy, had suddenly, and without any reference to the British Government, concluded such a treaty with the invaders as entirely superceded the necessity of the proposed mediation. The Treaty alluded to was never formally communicated to the British Government, but there is reason to believe that though it rescued the dominions of the **Goorkhali** from the more immediate danger with which they appeared to be threatened, it was, in other respects, by no means honourable to the rulers of that country; especially if it be true, as was affirmed at the time by some intelligent persons, that a little more firmness on the part of the Regency would speedily have compelled the Chinese (who had suffered greatly from the sickness and scarcity, and were not less impatient to quit Nepal than the Nepaulians were to get rid of them), to solicit the accomodation, which they were permitted to make a merit of granting.”

57. Chaudhuri, p. 69; IPSP, pp. 20--23.

58. Chaudhuri, p. 69.

59. Ibid

60. Ibid, p. 73.

61. Ibid, p. 77.

62. Ibid, p. 78.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid, p. 79.

65. Ibid, p. 80.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid, pp. 80—81.
68. Ibid. p. 81.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid, pp. 81—82.
72. Ibid, p. 84.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid, p. 85.
75. Ibid, p. 87.
76. Ibid, p. 94.
77. Ibid, p. 98; IPSP, pp. 26—28.
78. Chaudhuri, p. 99.
79. Ibid, p. 101.
80. Ibid; IPSP, pp. 41—44.
81. Regmi, p. 271.
82. Oldfield, pp. 284—285. Oldfield writes:— “Rana Bahadur Shah had two wives. His first and senior, the **Maharani** was a daughter of the **Gulmi Rajah**. She was a virtuous and high-minded princess, but unfortunately she was childless. She was soon neglected by the King, and her bed deserted. His second wife was the daughter not of a Rajput, but of a **Parbattiha Chatri**, and she bore him one son only, **Ranudat Sah**, who was the legitimate heir to the throne. In addition to these two **Ranis**, he had an amour with a girl, the daughter of a Brahman, but to whom he was not, and by the laws of caste could not be married; by her he had a son in 1795, necessarily illegitimate, but whom he afterwards adopted as his heir, in exclusion of his legitimate son by his junior wife.”
83. RBS, pp. 118—123.
84. Regmi, p. 271.
85. Smith, Vol. 1., pp. 168—169. Smith gives an account of his atrocities:— “He cursed his Kingdom, her

doctors, and the Gods of Nepaul, vowing vengeance on all. He first sent for the unfortunate Benaras doctors, denounced them as liars and impostors and ordered them to be soundly flogged, and each to have his right ear and nose cut off in his presence. This was duly performed, and they were afterwards started to the British dominions as a warning to all future impostors. He then wrecked his vengeance on the gods of Nepaul (not even excepting the famous temple at Pas Pat Nath) and after abusing them in the most gross way, he accused them of having obtained from him twelve thousand goats, some hundred weight of sweetmeats, two thousand gallons of milk & c. under false pretences, and that he would take summary vengeance for having wilfully disfigured his Queen.. He then ordered all the artillery, varying from 3 to 12 pounders to be brought in front of the palace, with all the made-up ammunition at Kathmandu. All the guns were then loaded to the muzzle, and down he marched to the head-quarters of the Nepaul deities. On arriving at Pas Pat Nath all the guns were drawn up in front of the several deities, honouring the most sacred with the heaviest metal. When the order to fire was given, many of the Chiefs and soldiers ran away panic stricken and others hesitated to obey the sacrilegious order; and not until several gunners opened. Down came the gods and goddess from their hitherto sacred positions; and after six hours heavy cannonading not a vestige of the deities remained. Their temples sharing the same fate the priests ran away confounded, many escaping to the British territory, but those who were not so fortunate were seized and each deprived of his holy head. The Goorkha King now became satisfied, vowing, however, no God should ever again be elevated in his dominions until his

departed Queen was restored to him.”

86. Landon, p. 72; RBS, p. 57
87. Chaudhuri, p. 106
88. Oldfield, p. 286; Sharma, p. 249; Hamilton, p. 253; Landon, p. 73.
89. Chaudhuri, p. 106
90. Ibid, p. 107.
91. Secret Consultation, April 16, 1801, No. 130; Chaudhuri, pp. 111–112.
92. Chaudhuri, p. 109.
93. Ibid, p. 110.
94. RSB, pp. 63–65; Chaudhuri, p. 112; IPSP, pp. 47–48, 62–63.
95. Chaudhuri, p. 11.
96. Ibid, p. 113.
97. Letter dated November 4, 1801, Secret Consultations, June 30, 1802, No. 18; Chaudhuri, p. 114.
98. Chaudhuri, p. 115.
99. Ibid. p. 120.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid, p. 121.
102. Ibid, p. 123.
103. Ibid, p. 121; Shah, p. 171; Secret Consultations, June 30, 1802, No. 2.
104. Chaudhuri, pp. 124–125.
105. Ibid, pp. 127–128
106. Secret Consultations, June 30, 1802, No. 45, para 3; RBS, p. 66; Chaudhuri, p. 126.
107. Chaudhuri, pp. 126–127.
108. Sharma, p. 240; Chaudhuri, p. 133.
109. Chaudhuri, p. 129; Acharya p. 115.
110. Chaudhuri, pp. 139–140.
111. Ibid, p. 143; Acharya, p. 119; Bhandari p. 217; Hamilton, p. 174
112. Wheeler, p. 470; Chaudhuri, p. 143; Wright, p. 264

## CAUSES OF THE WAR

Most of the Western scholars and their followers interpret the conflict between the East India Company and Nepal as the outcome of the Nepalese encroachments on the English territories. Thus Fraser<sup>1</sup> emphatically writes, "This power, emboldened by a long course of success and conquest, had commenced a deliberate system of encroachment on the British boundaries, and a course of insult towards its lower ministers, which at length, it became absolutely necessary to repeal." Captain T. Smith<sup>2</sup> also holds the same view and writes, "Simultaneously with his operations in the West, encroachments was countenanced to the eastward on the territories subject to the British Government." K. Majumdar,<sup>3</sup> believes that, "Doubtless, the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814-1816) owed its origin to the expansive and encroaching policy of the Nepalese." J. Talboys Wheeler<sup>4</sup> opines, "The Gorkha authorities had been gradually absorbing British territory along with the whole line of the frontier to the north of Hindustan, from the neighbourhood of Simla," and further adds, "it was discovered that within the previous quarter of a century more than two hundred British villages had been added to Nepal territory; and it was obvious that the aggression were conducted on a regular system having for its object the extension of Nepal (sic) dominion to the banks of the Ganges." Mr. R.K. Shah<sup>5</sup> is of the opinion that "Gorkha expansion brings Nepal face to face with the Company's government along a 900 mile long frontier from Sikkim

on the East to the Sutlej on the West." Perceval London<sup>6</sup> opines, "The expansion of Nepal East and West did not immediately affect the Indian Government, but it became another matter when, encouraged by our pre-occupation in other directions, the Gurkhas advanced south into the fertile Tarai, the lack of opposition encouraging them to a still further removing of their neighbour's landmarks." D. B. Sanwal<sup>7</sup> points out that when the Gorkhas has consolidated their position in the hills, and the Company had organised its conquests in the plains, the officials of the two Governments on their respective frontiers began to look up old records and revived or contested claims forgotten in a hurry and first carelessness of easy triumph. H. H. Dodwell<sup>8</sup> expresses his view that, "In 1814 the Gurkha frontier was continuous with that of British over a distance of seven hundred miles and the broder districts suffered terribly from their incessant inroads." Majumdar, Raychaudhuri and Dutta<sup>9</sup> inform us, "An unprovoked attack by the Gurkhas on three police-stations in Butwal in the month of May 1814 was followed in October by a declaration of war against them by the Governor-General, Lord Hastings." Thompson and Garratt<sup>10</sup> hold the view that, "he (Governor-General) sought opportunity to bring them (states) all where they would accept control of their armies and submit their mutual quarrels to British arbitration," and they further add, "border raids and boundary disputes passed into a war with Nepal." Sarkar and Dutta<sup>11</sup> express their views that, "the undefined frontiers and the rival claims of the English and the Gurkhas on the border district made a collision between them inevitable."

Forbes<sup>12</sup> thinks that "the root cause of the war between the Company and Nepal was the desire of the barons of Nepal to extend their sway over the zamindars of the plains and tap this convenient source of income, for whatever the pipers might tell of glory in the field it was the share-holders in London and the Court in Kathmandu that called the tune."

These scholars seem to have been satisfied with the declaration of Lord Moira when he declared the Gorkhas as aggressors. Lord Moira further "alleged that innumerable cases of encroachment has taken place some as old as the year 1787."<sup>13</sup>

A critical examination of the materials that are at our disposal reveal that neither the western nor the Nepalese historians have been able to do proper justice to the problem and hence are far away from the truth. After going through the various materials especially the secret documents<sup>14</sup> of the East India Company and the intercepted Nepalese letters,<sup>15</sup> we get the following causes of the war.

The policy of expansion adopted both by the Gorkhas and the East India Company brought the two on the common border of the Tarai. The Gorkhas had advanced as far as the Tarai. The English too adopted the policy of conquest and annexation which ultimately brought about their military confrontation.

The Nepalese were fully aware of the English designs and they preferred to remain aloof from them. Even Oldfield writes that the English were taken by the Nepalese as "dangerous and encroaching neighbours."<sup>16</sup> He further adds, ".....judging from the experience and fate of other states throughout India they are firmly convinced that if once the British gain a footing (even though it be a friendly character) within the valley of Nepal, from that time the knell of the national independence will have struck."<sup>17</sup>

The English, on their part, had made various attempts to come into closer contact with the Nepalese. They never missed the opportunity when they could interfere with the Nepalese. They had sent various missions to Nepal with the object of coming to closer contacts with the Nepalese. The first English Mission to visit Nepal was the Kinloch Mission.<sup>18</sup> It was proved to

be a failure and had to retreat. Then came the Kirkpatrick Mission<sup>19</sup> which also could not achieve success and had to go back. Maulvi Abdul Qadir Mission<sup>20</sup> also met the same fate. Knox Mission came in 1802.<sup>21</sup> It also proved to be unsuccessful and like the rest had to go back with a heavy heart. Bhim Sen Thapa, the then Prime Minister was fully aware of the English aggressive policy and had tried to remain aloof from them.<sup>22</sup>

It was quite clear to the Nepalese that their neighbouring country India was falling under the English gradually. This naturally aroused fear and suspicion in their minds. When they saw that the English were making ceaseless efforts to come into closer ties with Nepal their fear increased still more. Further still Nepal was a small country and it was but natural for her to fear the mighty English power, which had made several attempts to get a footing in the soil of Nepal. The secret letter from Lord Moira to the secret committee, dated the 2nd August 1815, also discloses the fact that the Nepalese did not like the presence of English in Kathmandu whereas the English wanted to stay there by any means.<sup>23</sup>

Nepal being a small country could not resist the English single handedly. Because of this fact she made secret attempts to establish friendly ties with the rulers of the neighbouring countries against the common enemy. Bhim Sen Thapa invited the Tibetan ruler<sup>24</sup> to come to a mutual understanding for the common interest. He made appeals to him to make sustained efforts to meet the challenge of the formidable foe. Help was sought from the Marathas also.<sup>25</sup> He did not hesitate in sending even Pandit Padmapani Sharma in 1814 as a Nepalese envoy to the Gwalior Court to seek military assistance to fight against the English.<sup>26</sup> The Sikh Government was also approached for the same purpose. Khardar Prithibi was sent as an envoy to the Sikh Court.<sup>27</sup> Help was also sought from the Rohillas<sup>28</sup> against the English. Special emphasis was laid

on having contact with the Chinese Emperor<sup>29</sup> who was also warned that the English were trying to enter Tibet through Nepal. Advice was given that they should make combined efforts against the common enemy. The envoys who represented Nepal in the Tibetan court were **Sardar Damar Thapa** and **Yudhisthir Thapa**.<sup>30</sup>

Even at the Nepalese Court there was no peace. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there was conflict among the courtiers. Intrigues and jealousies were the order of the day. All these factors combined made it easy for the English to interfere in the Nepalese affairs. As mentioned earlier, when Knox was in Kathmandu he had even made efforts to bribe the Nepalese courtiers. He wanted to bring some of them to his side for the furtherance of his interest.<sup>31</sup>

Another cause of the conflict was that the English wanted to develop trade relation<sup>32</sup> with the Tibetans and the Chinese. They contemplated that advantageous trade with these countries could be possible only through this country. The secret letter from Lord Moira to the Secret Committee, dated the 11th May 1815, discloses that the English wanted to have control over Kumaon for her trade monopoly beyond the Himalayas.<sup>33</sup> For this reason also establishment of hegemony over Nepal was essential.

The behaviour of the defeated rulers of the border also created an opportunity for the conflict. Thus, M. R. Pant<sup>34</sup> rightly points out that the members of the Royal Family of Kumaon and Garhwal who were defeated by the Gorkha King naturally had hatred and jealousy towards the victor. These defeated members of the Royal Family were also in search of an opportunity when they would regain their independence and the English took advantage of the situation. Money was lent to **Lal Singh** and **Sudarshan Shah** of Kumaon<sup>35</sup> to fight against the Nepalese. Vested interests would always try to utilize

such a situation. The confidential letters of M. Scott,<sup>36</sup> Dr. Buchanan,<sup>37</sup> Secretary Adams (dated the 9th September 1814,<sup>38</sup> and the 30th September, 1814),<sup>39</sup> Fraser,<sup>40</sup> and the translations of the letters from the Bishts to Rowaen, dated the 1st December 1814, to Seebram and others clearly indicate that many Nepalese from the border had taken shelter in the territories of the English East India Company and also of the Chinese. They also throw sufficient light on the point that the English were supporting the exiled Nepalese against the Government of Nepal.

Another factor responsible for the conflict was the lack of natural boundaries between the British occupied territories of India and that of Nepal. The rulers of both the countries made claims over different villages and this ultimately led to border conflicts. The Governor-General's declaration of the 1st November 1814 reveals that the lack of proper demarcation of boundaries was one of the causes of the war.<sup>42</sup>

The English were under the impression that Nepal was very rich in gold. They wanted to get it by any means. Moreover, they had their eyes upon the Tarai lands for another reason also. The avaricious English people desired to possess the rich and fertile lands of the Tarai which would increase their income. The secret letter from Lord Moira to the Secret Committee, dated the 11th May 1815, discloses that the Governor-General was very keen to possess Kumaon for her considerable revenue.<sup>43</sup> Another secret letter from Lord Moira, dated the 20th July 1815, further reveals that, "The province of Kumaon is intrinsically a valuable possession, from its revenue, its mines and its timber."<sup>44</sup> It was thus evident that success in their scheme would bring them a great deal of profit.

It would not be unreasonable to presume that the hot climate of India could not have satisfied the English who would have always cherished the idea of getting some cold places of Nepal as their summer resort.

M.R. Pant<sup>45</sup> rightly suggests that the English had their eyes upon Nepal for a Long time. The cold climate of this place was greatly liked by them.

After the Nepalese were fully convinced that the English would not allow them to look after the affairs and interests of their country they had no other alternative than to made sustained efforts to prepare the country militarily and politically to face the aggressive designs of the unscrupulous enemy on the frontier. The leader of the country contemplated over this important issue and made elaborate plans to meet the challenge.

Great organiser and statesman, Bhim Sen Thapa, realized that without having an efficient army equipped with up-to-date weapons he would not be able to meet the army of the ferocious enemy. So he even thought it proper to take the help of the Europeans in the organisation work of the army. The worst enemy of the English and the most efficient fighters of the time, the French, were attracted to come to help Nepal in this field. They revolutionised the military organisation of the country. They introduced uniforms in the Nepalese army to make them smart. Special emphais was accorded to their up-to-date training in warfare.<sup>46</sup>

No country can depend upon others for the supply of arms needed for the defence of the country. With this idea in mind Bhim Sen Thapa took measures for the manufacture of the urgently needed weapons such as cannons, bombs and guns. According to the report of Maulvi Abdul Qadir the King of Nepal “retained in his services “Firinghees” and put them in charge of their artillery.” He further explains that one of them was a Frenchman whose task was to cast cannons. Before his removal from office “about 200 cannons were cast by him.”<sup>47</sup> It is also evident that he trained the Nepalese to cast cannons.

Formerly there was no arrangment for keeping soldiers in the barracks. Possibly by the advice of

the French officers they were introduced. Presumably on the Nepalese side there were about 12,000 troops.

Even though Nepal did not possess a vast army, she had able Generals and gallant fighters whose deeds of chivalry attracted attention not only of the men of our country but also of the enemy who was forced to commend their heroic and patriotic qualities. Besides nature had provided her with the best defence. Determined Generals and troops were deployed at all the strategic points from where it was not possible even for the powerful enemy to move further in an easy manner.

In order to get the information about the preparation of the English, messengers and spies were sent to different parts of India. This is clear from the letter written by Bum Shah to **Maharaja Dhiraj Girbana**.<sup>48</sup>

The letter from Rutherford to Secretary Adams dated the 1st October 1814 states that "the alarm at our preparation is now general throughout all the provinces of this frontier and measures are taking to oppose us."<sup>49</sup> This letter further states that the Nepalese spies were stationed in the towns of Saharanpur, Moradabad and Bareilly.<sup>50</sup>

As mentioned above, Bhim Sen Thapa sent an envoy to the Gwalior Court for military assistance. The Rohillas were encouraged by the Nepalese to rise against the British to regain their independence. An envoy was sent to the Court of Ranjit Singh for help against the English. Chinese and Tibetan assistance was also sought after the out-break of the war. The letter from Girbana to the Chinese Emperor indicates that most probably the Chinese Emperor was regarded by him as the Suzerain of Nepal and so an appeal for help was made to him.<sup>51</sup>

The English, who were noted throughout the world for their intelligent work, could not keep themselves ignorant of all these developments in Nepal.

The letter from Superintendent T. Rutherford to Secretary Adams dated the 6th July 1814,<sup>52</sup> indicates that numerous agents were dispersed all over Nepal by the Company to seek intelligence specially in connection with the Communication and the inhabitants of Nepal. Mr. M. Scott's letter to Secretary Adams dated the 12th August 1814<sup>53</sup> also gives us the information that spies were sent by the East India Company to get information about Nepal.

Mr. M. R. Pant<sup>54</sup> writes that Dr. Rutherford did intelligence work for the English. It is also seen that he distributed money among the people of Kumaon Garhwal and utilized them in the espionage work against Nepal. The Nepalese also did not keep quiet and Bum Shah was clever enough to get information of the preparation of the war on the English side through a bearer of Dr. Rutherford.<sup>55</sup> Bum Shah is seen to have engaged himself in the espionage work from the Nepalese side.<sup>56</sup>

The English were great propogandists. Due to their propoganda they were successful to win over the natives of the protected states of the border to their side.<sup>57</sup> The Nepalese had no such advantages.

When preparations were thus being made by both sides the border conflict question again came into prominence. The zamindar of Bettiah **Rajah** Bir Kishore Singh, sent to Rautahat **purganna** armed **sepoys** numbering 1600. The result of this was that **Subba** Laxman Giri was killed while defending the Nepal territory. The **Rajah** of Nepal protested to the Governor-General on the 27th January 1811<sup>58</sup> and he was given assurance by the Magistrate of Patna, Mr. Hawkins, that Bir Kishore Singh would be punished by the British Government. At the request of Nepal, the British Government appointed a committee to decide who was the real aggressor. On the report of the committee, the Company's Government held the Nepalese officers responsible for the conflict. The result of this was that the Anglo-Nepalese relations became cooler.

In the meantime, border disputes arose in various places like the frontiers of Purnea, Saran, Gorakhpur, Bareilly and other places. Disputes at Butwal and Sheoraj have been taken by most of the scholars as the most important cause of the war.<sup>59</sup>

The Nepalese version was that since Sheoraj and Butwal belonged to Palpa and as the latter was annexed to Nepal, those two districts passed under the Nepal Government. Nepal also suggested that the question should be amicably settled by a joint commission. One-sided report of Bradshaw indicated that these two disputed areas belonged to the British Government. Lord Moira wrote to Nepal Government to evacuate them. But when the Nepal Government refused to do so the Governor-General sent an armed force to capture them. The Nepalese retired without resisting them <sup>60</sup>

On the approach of the rainy season, the British force was withdrawn and some armed police-men were left there for internal peace. In the meantime the Governor of Palpa received the order from the Nepalese **Durbar** to re-capture the disputed territories. The Nepalese troops marched there and captured them. In the conflict eighteen police-men were killed and six wounded on the British side.<sup>61</sup> On hearing this news Lord Hastings was determined on war with Nepal.

J. Talboys Wheeler<sup>63</sup> expresses the English point of view in a different manner. He tries to show that the Nepalese Commissioner "was unable to disprove the fact or to show that his government had any claim whatever to the disputed territory." As Lord Moira's ultimatum to the Nepal Court proved to be ineffective, "a British detachment took possession of the districts without opposition and set up police-stations for their protections."

Seeing the attitude and behaviour of the English, the Nepalese were forced to realise that the

former would not hesitate in taking any action for the realisation of their cherished goal. So Nepal had before her only two alternatives — to face the challenge or bow down before the English.

In the Nepalese Court the Council of **Bhardar** resolved on war and “they sent a large force into the disputed districts which had been recovered by the English, and attacked a police-station and slaughtered eighteen constables.”<sup>64</sup> This was taken by Lord Moira as a pretext for the war.

B.D. Sanwal<sup>65</sup> convincingly suggests that reasonable points in favour of the Nepalese Government were kept aside and unnecessary emphasis was laid on the genuineness of the British claim. A retrospect of the whole affair leaves no doubt that hasty action was taken by the East India Company only because it was bent upon having a war with Nepal for the realisation of its cherished hopes. Thus one may be correctly inclined to suggest that Sheoraj and Butwal affairs were nothing but mere pretence for making Nepal responsible for the outbreak of the war.

The English claim that Butwal belonged to them is proved<sup>66</sup> by the fact that (1) Major Bradshaw had made this contract with the manager of Prithibi Pal Sen, the ruler of the area (2) the receipt of the Vazier’s Amils (3) verbal statements of some **Kanungos** (4) a letter of the **Rajah** of Nepal to Wellesley in October 1804 in which the **Rajah** claimed to look after the management of the **zamindari** of Butwal and agreed to pay the settled rent and (5) a letter to the Governor-General by Amar Singh Thapa and several other Nepalese officers in which a promise was made by them to pay the revenue to the Company.

The Nepalese on the other hand had two **Ikararnaamas** of the years before the cession of these territories by the Nawab to the East India Company.<sup>67</sup> As regards Sheoraj, **Kanungos** of Bansi and the servants

of the East India Company repeated on oath that Sheoraj had paid revenues in certain years (not regularly) to the Vazier before the cession in 1801 and the Chaudharies of Sheoraj who were in the service of the Nepal Government repeated on oath that no such revenues were ever paid.<sup>68</sup>

The Governor-General in his declaration made it known to the people concerned that the affairs of these two places had left him no other alternative than to go to war for the protection of the rights of the East India Company.<sup>69</sup> But a closer examination of these affairs reveals that the East India Company in reality had no sincere desire to come to an amicable settlement with Nepal. The representatives did not give proper hearing to the points raised in favour of the Nepalese. Hastily and without due consideration of the several factors connected with this problem declaration was made that Sheoraj and Butwal belonged to the East India Company. This ultimately resulted in the killing of eighteen police-men of the English which had forcibly occupied the Nepalese territory. As a result Lord Moira got the best opportunity to declare war upon Nepal on November 1, 1814.<sup>70</sup>

*Foot Note:—*

1. Feaser, p. 3.
2. Smith, Vol. I, p. 172.
3. Majumdar, (Unpublished Thesis).
4. Wheeler, p. 472.
5. R.K. Shah, (Unpublished Thesis).
6. Landon, p. 75.
7. Sanwal, p. 115.
8. Dodwell, p. 378.
9. AHI, p. 722.
10. RFB, pp. 254-255.
11. MIP, p. 201.
12. Forbes, pp. 46-47.
13. Sanwal, p. 116.
14. PRN.
15. PRN; Fraser.
16. Oldfield. p. 301.
17. Ibid.
18. Chatterji, p. 16.
19. Ibid, p. 19.
20. Chaudhuri, p. 95.
21. Chatterji, p. 20.
22. GFK, pp. 67-68
23. PRN, p. 675.
24. BST, pp. 94-101.
25. GFK, p. 70.
26. BST, p. 122.
27. Ibid, p. 124.
28. Ibid, p. 135.
29. Ibid, p. 136.
30. Ibid, pp. 135-138; Bhandari, p. 225. Woodyatt, N. G., in his book, "History of the 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles 1815-1927," London, 1929, (pp.2-3), writes:— "when the Nepal wars with the British broke out, the Gurkhas supplicated the Court of Peking for

intervention and armed assistance on the plea that the British real objective was China. They asserted that the passes from Nepal through the Himalayas had been demanded of them, which they, as faithful allies to China, had refused to yield !”

He further adds, “In 1816 some Nepalese confidential agents, whose attendance in Peking had been demanded, were scolded pretty severely by the Chinese authorities, and there the matter ended.”

31. Chaudhuri, p. 121.
32. Ibid, , p. 122.
33. PRN, p. 551,
34. **Poornima**, 2/1, p. 60.
35. Ibid.
36. PRN, p, 33.
37. Ibid, pp. 44–46.
38. Ibid, p. 60
39. Ibid, p. 66.
40. Ibid, p. 247.
41. Ibid, p. 296.
42. Ibid, pp. 444–447.
43. Ibid, pp. 550–551.
44. Ibid, p. 673.
45. **Poornima**, 1/1, p. 51.
46. GFK, pp. 78–79.
47. Chaudhuri, p. 93.
48. **Poornima**, 2/1, pp. 54–55.
49. PRN, p. 96.
50. Ibid.
51. **BST**, pp. 136–138. See Appendix No. 9. We do not see anywhere that Nepal actually accepted Chinese suzerainty. Although these letters make us suspicious about Nepal accepting Chinese suzerainty, we can presume that Nepal must have had cordial and intimate relation with China so she sought the Chinese help with good words.
52. PBN, p. 7.

53. Ibid, p. 33.
54. **Poornima**, 2/1, pp. 61-62.
55. Ibid, p. 62.
56. Ibid.
57. **Poornima**, 1/1, p. 49; 1/4, pp. 79-81; 2/1, pp. 54-62.
58. Chaudhuri, p. 153.
59. Sanwal, pp. 117-119.
60. Ibid, p. 118.
61. Ibid, p. 141.
62. Chaudhuri, p, 162.
63. Ibid.
64. Wheeler, p, 474.
65. Ibid.
66. Sanwal, pp. 135-141.
67. Ibid, p. 135.
68. Ibid.
69. Wheeler, p. 560. Commenting on the declaration of the war, Philips, C.H., in his book, "The East India Company 1789-1834," Manchester University Press, 1940, (p.198), writes, "for several years past the Bengal Government had been aware that it was necessary to define the Company's northern frontier, which touched Nepalese territory for over 700 miles. The Company's border districts in this area constantly suffered from the incursions of the Nepalese. Minto had remonstrated with them in vain; Moira garrisoned the disputed districts, but the Gurkhas slew the garrisons. On 18 February 1814, the home Government advised Moira that the continuance of this encroachment would justify a declaration of war. Moira, who was by profession a soldier and who, like Cornwallis, had received the combined offices of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, was himself inclined to make war, which was finally declared against Nepal on 1 November 1814."
70. Husain, (Unpublished Thesis).

## THE WAR

An attempt has been made in the previous chapter to discuss various causes responsible for the war. The English were bent upon having the realisation of their interest on some pretext. The Nepalese could not afford to show their points of weakness. Besides, the English were free from the European Wars, and hence they might have thought that the fate of Nepal should be decided before the latter was fully prepared to meet the adversary. The murder of the eighteen police-men<sup>1</sup> of the English, by the Nepalese on May 29, 1814, served as a *Casus-belli*. Lord Moira declared war upon Nepal on November 1, 1814.<sup>2</sup>

The Governor-General himself planned the military operations. He was determined to launch an attack on Nepal "at the most vulnerable points."<sup>3</sup> For this purpose the English force were divided into four divisions<sup>4</sup> which were kept under able Generals. Thus the first division which consisted of 7,989 men with 26 guns was put under General Marelly, who was to move from the Sarun frontier towards Mackwanpur, which was supposed to be the gate of the Kathmandu Valley. His political agent was Major Bradshaw. The second division had a strength of 4,689 men with twelve guns and was to be under the charge of General Wood, who was to move from Gorkhpur to Butwal and finally towards Nuwakot and Tansen. Wood had to perform the duty of a political agent also. The commander of the third division was General Gillespie who had 10,422 men with 20 guns at his disposal and was to

move from Saharunpur towards Dehra Dun. General Ochterlony, the ablest General, the shrewdest diplomat and the greatest strategist of the time, was to lead an army of 7,112 men with 22 guns from Ludhiyana. Ochterlony was charged with the responsibility of fighting Amar Singh Thapa at Ropar. His political assistant was Fraser. Besides the eastward defence of the frontier was entrusted to Captain Latter who had a force of 2,723 men. The Magistrate of Rangpur, Mr. Scott was to open correspondence with Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet. Captain Latter was to act as Scott's political agent.<sup>5</sup>

To meet this vast English force under able Generals the Nepalese Government was not able to assemble more than 12,000 men, including fresh recruits. Kaji Bhaktabir Thapa was in command of the eastern province with his headquarters at Bijayapur. Under him there were 2,000 troops who were stationed in various fortresses in the Mahabharat range. Colonel Ranbir Singh Thapa was sent to Mackwanpur with an army of about 4,000. Colonel Uzir Singh Thapa was in Palpa with an army of about 3,000.<sup>6</sup> But although the Nepalese were only a few in number they had patriotic fervour, passionate enthusiasm and deep loyalty.

In modern warfare undeclared attack is not regarded as treacherous or immoral. Probably with this advantage in mind the English troops had penetrated into the Nepalese territories even before the declaration of war by Lord Moira on November 1, 1814.

### BATTLE OF NALAPANI

Before making a critical examination of the different factors responsible for the defeat of the Nepalese it would be better to give in brief the chief events of the war. "The first campaign of the Nepal war was commenced by the seizure of the Timley Pass into the Dehra Dun Valley on the 20th October by Lieutenant Colonel Carpenter, who was detached for that purpose by

Major General Gillespie. Dehra Dun itself was occupied by Colonel Marley on the 22nd October 1814.”<sup>7</sup> This was followed by the attack on Kalunga fortress in the hill of Nalapani. This Kalaunga Fort was under the command of Bal Bhadra. He had under him 300 to 400 men.<sup>8</sup> The third division which was under the command of General Gillespie was formed into four columns and a reserve; the first was under Colonel Carpenter and consisted of 611 men, the second under Captain Fast consisted of 363 men, the third under Major Kelley had 541 men, the fourth was under Captain Campbell and he commanded 283 men and lastly there was the reserve of 938 men under Major Ludlow.<sup>9</sup>

They were all instructed to ascend the fort of Kalunga as soon as the signal of firing of a gun was heard. But General Gillespie’s hastily signal for the assault some hours sooner went unnoticed by Major Kelley, Captain Campbell and Captain Fast. As a result General Gillespie himself was shot dead. The English “loss was severe.” Even Fraser opines in the following words—“Such were the results of the unfortunate affairs of Kalunga, the first enterprise of the war.”<sup>10</sup>

The Nepalese side also suffered a heavy loss. But the English did not attempt another attack until the reinforcement from Delhi arrived. Soon after this the attack was launched again but when the Commander saw that the Nepalese morale was very high, he cut off the water-way leading to the fort. The Nepalese leader Bal Bhadra followed by seventy personnels left the Camp on the morning of the 30th November 1814 with naked swords in their shoulders, khukri on their waist, approached the river, quenched their thirst and fled away. The English, no doubt, gained victory over the Kalunga fortress but inside the fortress there was nothing but the dead bodies and the destructed articles.

## BATTLE OF JYATHAK

After the occupation of Dehra Dun the Company's army proceeded to Nahan which had been abandoned by the Nepalese on the approach of the British troops. "The Gorkhas withdrew to the fort of Jyathak which was situated on a lofty hill of that name. The Gorkha forces were commanded in this quarter by Kaji Runjore Singh Thapa, the son of Amar Singn Thapa and were estimated to amount two thousand two hundred fighting men after they had been joined by reinforcement"<sup>12</sup>

The British force next moved towards Nahan and was joined by Major Gernerel Martindell. After the occupation of Nahan, Martindell proceeded to seize" two important positions situated respectively on the western and eastern sides of the fort of Jyathak which was under the command of Runjore Singh Thapa. The purpose of this was that he expected to cut off the enemy from their principal watering places and to intercept their communications with the surrounding country."<sup>13</sup> But they did not reach their cherished goal and the result was that the troops under Major Ludlow had to suffer heavy losses in the hands of the Nepalese.<sup>14</sup> Major General Martindell made no further attempts till further reinforcements arrived in February, 1815.

After the arrival of the reinforcement, under the command of Major Richards, General Martindell detached a force to occupy a position on the eastern side of the fort with a view to intercept the enemy's communications with the neighbouring country. This time luck favoured the English. Major Richards was successful and routed the Nepalese from height with considerable loss. The Nepalese commander and several other troops fell into the English hands. Major General Martindell also occupied other positions on different sides of the fort. But at this stage negotiations ensued between General Ochterlony and the Nepalese Commander, Amar Singh Thapa. Under the

terms of the Capitulations which had then been agreed to, Jyathak was surrendered to the English.<sup>15</sup>

### BATTLE OF JITGARH

Now let us turn to General S. Wood's campaign. On the 13th December 1814, the troops began to move from Gorakhpur towards the Butwal pass. But information was received that the enemy was moving down the pass.<sup>16</sup> An advance party was sent to meet if any incursions occurred. On January 1, 1815, preparations were made to ascend the hills and carry the strong post of Jitgarh. Under Major Comyn the army was detached to take the Nepalese troops in the rear while the main body continued their route through the forest. The wrong impression which the British troops had about the Nepalese stockade misled them and as a result the British troops had to retreat ultimately.

On April 15, 1815<sup>17</sup> the British army encamped near Butwal and started making preparations for attacking the stockade that protected it. The war broke out and after some time the English made attempts to cross the river which flows past the town with a view to possessing it. But this attempt proved to be a complete failure and the English had to retreat. They retreated to Gorakhpur, and towards the "middle of May they went into cantonments."<sup>18</sup>

### BATTLE OF PARSA AND SAMRANPUR

Now let us take up the case of General Marley who proceeded to Bettiah on the 23rd November 1814.<sup>19</sup> The Tarai had been cleared off the Nepalese by the detachments under Colonel Bradshaw and Major Roughsedge. Bradshaw attacked and carried the fort of Buhurwa which was "commanded by Parsuram Thapa, who, with four other Sardar and 51 sepoys was killed."<sup>20</sup> Chandra Sekhar Upadhaya also surrendered.<sup>21</sup>

In the latter part of December "the Chief position of the army was at Loatun to the left and

westward Captain Sibley lay at Pura, Captain Hay was at Baragurhee on the right, still further Captain Blackney and on the extreme right Captain Roughsedge was encamped on the banks of the river Rattoo.”<sup>22</sup> On the Nepalese side the main army was collected at Mackwanpur and was commanded by Ranbir Singh. Ranbir ordered his men to launch an attack on Sibley and Blackney because he knew the position where they were stationed. Rana Kaji commanded the party sent against Pursa and Sarbajit Thapa attacked Sumunpur, Captain Blackey was completely defeated by Sarbajit Thapa whereas Captain Sibley was “more on his guard.”<sup>23</sup> In spite of that the Nepalese troops here proved to be more than a match to the British soldiers and as a result Captain Sibley was killed in the action. After this the English moved the camp from Loatun to Bettiah to protect it.

General Marley saw it impossible to face the Nepalese troops and on February 10, he left the camp.<sup>24</sup> “The unaccountable step adopted by General Marley seemed to the Governor-General to demand his immediate and permanent removal.”<sup>25</sup>

General Wood had been ordered to succeed General Marley.<sup>26</sup> But, before that could be done a senior Brigadier had already assumed the command.

On the 20th February, Lieutenant Pickersgill left the camp at Brinjaree Pokree to reconnoitre with a small escort a party of the Nepalese. After an exchange of fire he retired and was joined by a party of Gardiner’s troops and Colonel Dick with some irregular cavalry troops. The Nepalese, on seeing the cavalry troops, hesitated to fight. Pickersgill was successful in driving away the Nepalese, from all the posts they had occupied in the Tarai. General George Wood, however, was badly misled by a false rumour. “He reported to the head-quarters that the Nepalese (sic) had a force numerically greater than his own.”<sup>27</sup> General Wood failed to enter Nepal and ordered his men to return to the cantonments.

## BATTLE OF KUTAL GARH

Now let us turn our attention to Kumaon side. The territory of Kumaon had not been left undisturbed. The Governor-General received information from Gardiner<sup>28</sup> that Kumaon was poorly garrisoned by the Nepalese and some local landlords were very enthusiastic about the action against the Nepalese. Under Lieutenant Colonel Gardiner the troops were sent in which Captain Hearsey was also included. By the end of February 1815 Lieutenant Colonel Gardiner entered the Kumaon province from Rohilkhand through the Kashipur pass and took possession of small forts which belonged to the Nepalese who did not oppose him. He finally fixed himself in a strong position on the hill at Kampur.<sup>29</sup> From the other side Captain Hearsey entered and seized two or three similar forts. Captain Hearsey was attacked on the western bank of the Gogra river but he successfully foiled the attempts of the enemy and beset the fortress of Kotal Garh.

On the 2nd April 1815, Hasti Dal Chautariya crossed the river Sarada at Kusmati Ghat.<sup>30</sup> Captain Hearsey attacked Hasti Dal but he had to suffer defeat and fell a prisoner into the Nepalese hand and the English were driven from Kotal Garh.<sup>31</sup> Here the English had adopted pincer movement.

This incident was followed by another disaster. Captain Hearsey's adjutant, Mr. Martindell, who had been stationed on the banks of the Sarada with 300 men, was attacked by the Nepalese troops and had to flee away for safety.<sup>32</sup>

Reinforcement sent under Colonel Nicolls arrived at Katar Mul on the 8th April 1815 and as soon as the troops assembled, a detachment under the command of Major Patoon was ordered to seize a post situated to the north-west of Almorah. In this attack Hasti Dal Chautariya was killed.<sup>33</sup> Colonel Nicolls took the

advantage of the death of Hasti Dal **Chautariya** and “on the 25th April he attacked and carried by assault the height and town of Almorah.”<sup>34</sup> The attempt on the side of the Nepalese to recover the position proved to be a failure and this was followed by a conclusion of a convention under which the provision was that the Nepalese would have to evacuate the province and retire across the Kali.<sup>35</sup>

Captain Latter had been entrusted with the defence of the northern frontier to the east of Kosi. He was also successful in gaining the co-operation of the **Sikkim Rajah** who had been a feudatory to Nepal.<sup>36</sup> Captain Latter was also successful in securing the British safety as well as in depriving the Nepalese of “considerable Portion of Morung district.”<sup>37</sup> The result of this was that the Nepalese had to suffer a great defeat and an important province like Kumaon with an extensive, fertile and valuable tract in the Tarai was annexed to the British dominions.<sup>38</sup>

## BATTLE OF DEOTHAL AND MALAON

The 4th division under the command of Ochterlony penetrated the hills in the direction of Nala Gadh and brought it under control.<sup>39</sup> Amar Singh was stationed at Irkee with about 3,000 soldiers. From there he moved his forces to a high and difficult ridge of mountains and took defensive position with the fort of Ramgadh on his right.<sup>40</sup> From there Ochterlony proceeded to Ramgadh but was driven back to their rear and there he engaged himself intercepting the enemy's communications.<sup>41</sup> Ochterlony then shifted his headquarters round the Nahar on the north east side of the Ramgadh ridge and from there proceeded to the southern extremity of the Malaon range. Colonel Arnold was successful in taking up a position in Belaspur. The **Rajah** of Belaspur betrayed the Nepalese and went over to the English side.<sup>42</sup>

After this, attention was again diverted to the fort of Ramgadh. Amar Singh also went to Malaon with his troops. The English were trying their best to reduce Malaon and force Amar Singh to capitulate or to retreat to the eastward where the hostile army had been kept to oppose his progress and finally destroyed him. In the meantime the English planned to attack Malaon itself from all possible points.<sup>43</sup>

The chief column for the attack of Deothal was placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Thompson. Two formidable attacks were also to be made against the position of Malaon itself, one was to move from Kali under Captain Bowyer while the other under Captain Stowers from Ruttungurh.<sup>44</sup>

Under Colonel Thompson the party reached the height of Deothal without any opposition. But there was a body of Nepalese who had been lying in ambush, and they started up in confusion. At this time Major Lawrie arrived and with a joint attack the English were able to drive away the Nepalese troops and they established themselves at the height on which they had attained first success.

Another column commanded by Captain Stowers advanced up the hill towards the cantonment of the Nepalese. The Nepalese troops met them and a severe battle took place and there the English suffered a great loss and had to retreat.<sup>45</sup> In course of the fight in the west, Captain Bower advanced from the north hill and occupied a fine position. But on hearing of the defeat of the English on the western side he thought it wise enough to retreat. Although the English retreated from these points they had been successful in preventing the best troops of the Nepalese from opposing the real attack.<sup>46</sup>

Bhakti Thapa, who was the commander of Soorajeegurh had left that post to visit Amar Singh Thapa at Malaon, and from there he took the largest

portion of the troops encamped there with full directions from Amar Singh Thapa to use his own discretions with them. Early in the next morning the Nepalese attacked the enemy. Amar Singh encouraged his men to the assault from a height and Bhakti Thapa moved with them to every fresh attack.<sup>47</sup>

According to Fraser the loss of the Nepalese side was 700.<sup>48</sup> Their great loss was the loss their Chief—Bhakti Thapa, who was seventy years old “but still preserved the fire of youth and much of its vigour. Bhakti Thapa was the strength and dependence of the army and with his loss the Nepalese suffered a great blow.”<sup>49</sup> The English, on hearing the heroic death of Bhakti Thapa sent the dead body to the Nepalese side wrapped in a shawl,<sup>50</sup> i.e., a mark of respect and honour.

The death of Captain Stowers, on the English side, was also a great loss to them. After his death Lieutenant Armstrong stepped forward to the dangerous post. On the other side Lieutenant Cartwright and Lieutenant Lawrie were facing the Nepalese troops. With the death of Bhakti Thapa, “after many partial desertions nearly the whole of the troops left the fort and came into the British Camp.”<sup>51</sup> Amar Singh Thapa was left with only 250 men at Malaon which was ultimately conquered by the British.<sup>52</sup>

Realising that Amar Singh’s courage, skill and loyalty to his country would not allow him to surrender ignominiously he was asked by Ochterlony to leave Malaon with his “arms, colours and equipments.”<sup>53</sup> The English were forbidden to do anything that would provoke Amar Singh at the time of his march from that fort. The Nepalese defeat at Malaon sealed their fate in the war and broke their power of resistance against the British. Negotiations for peace were started by the Nepalese after May 1815.<sup>54</sup>

Although the English had to face severe losses at several places, the total results of the campaigns were more favourable to them. The Nepalese began to realise that they could not resist the superior forces of the East India Company for a long time. Under such circumstances, with the retreat of two able **Sardars** like Bum Shah and Amar Singh Thapa, negotiation for peace was opened at different places through different persons.<sup>55</sup> On the 28th May 1815<sup>56</sup> **Guru Gajraj Misra**, accompanied by Chandra Sekher Upadhyaya, arrived in Major Bradshaw's camp at Saran and produced a paper under the **Rajah's** red seal which he was given powers to negotiate for peace. The English wanted to have the settlement on the following terms: — "First the perpetual cession of all the hill country taken in the campaign, viz, from the Kalee, westward. Secondly, a like cession of the entire Tarai from the foot of the outer hills along the whole line of the remaining territory of the Goorkhas. Thirdly, the relinquishment by the Goorkhas of the footing they had gained in territory of the Sikkim **Rajah**, and the surrender to that Chief of the stockaded forts of Nagree and Nagurkot and finally the reception of a president with the usual escort and establishment at Kathmandu, and the customary stipulation not to receive or give service to Europeans without the special sanction of the government."<sup>57</sup> But **Guru Gajraj Misra** declared his inability to treat for any cession of the Tarai lands and as a result the negotiation was broken off and **Gajraj** returned to Kathmandu.<sup>58</sup>

The Nepalese Court, with the hope that other negotiators would be able to obtain more favourable conditions, empowered **Chautariya** Bum Shah to communicate with Edward Gardiner at Kumaon.<sup>59</sup> But Gardiner was also given the same instructions and ultimately this second attempt also failed. The main reason of the failure of the negotiation was the Tarai question. "As most of the principal **Sardars** of Nepal enjoyed considerable **Jagirs** in that territory"<sup>60</sup> they were not willing to loose it.

Lord Hasting was induced to modify the terms of the treaty so "as to offer the grant of similar possessions or an equivalent in money pensions of rupees, the distribution left at the uncontrolled pleasure of the Durbar."<sup>61</sup> But even then settlement was not possible because "Tarai was a bar to the establishment of peace."<sup>62</sup>

Before going into the details of the procedure of the negotiation for peace which will be discussed in the following chapter, let us first take the various factors responsible for the failure of the Nepalese to meet the challenge of the East India Company.

There are various reasons for the defeat of the Nepalese in the war. The first important factor to be noted in this connection is that Nepal could not get help from any corner even when she had sent missions to several places. Nepal had to face the vast English army alone. She had expected that she would be able to secure assistance from several Indian States as well as from China<sup>63</sup> against the common enemy. The reason for not getting the help was probably the early declaration of the war before anything could be finally decided by the different States. It is also just possible that there was a feeling among the Indians that the English were very powerful and hence annoying them would mean to invite a great danger. This seems to be the case with the Chinese also. Had there been a joint effort of the Indian rulers and the Nepalese, the English could have easily been defeated. The result of this war that one after the other all the Indian Princes had to submit to the English. The English had a very tactful policy of "divide and rule." With this policy they helped one state against the other and finally forced them to depend solely on the former even for their survival.

It is also possible that the rulers of the Indian States like those of Gwalior, Punjab and Oudh did not render assistance to Nepal because they might have

thought that helping a powerful neighbour would be a danger to themselves later on. They might have seen that before the Anglo-Nepalese War, Nepal had also followed the policy of expansion and annexation at the cost of weak neighbours. That Sansar Chand had become a victim of this policy was fresh in their mind. The then Prime Minister of Nepal, General Bhim Sen Thapa was also responsible for the war. It was due to his ignorance of the political condition of India at that time. He knew that there was discontent in many States of India with the British domination. He therefore cherished the hope that they would help Nepal War. But he did not possess the real knowledge of the condition of those states. The Treaty of Amritsar (1809) checked the Sikh Sarkar from interfering across the east of Sutlej. The Scindia had already accepted the subsidiary system. The Nawab of Oudh was so much weakened that an effectual help from him was out of question. Under such circumstances he failed to get help from any of these states against the English.

If we now turn to China we find that the Emperor of that country had no intention of breaking the friendly relation with the English by helping Nepal. The same view was also shared by Dalai Lama towards Nepal.

It is well known that both troops and weapons play a vital role in the war. Bhim Sen Thapa waged war with the English without making sufficient military preparations on the border which over 800 miles in length. It is true that foreigners were employed by Bhim Sen Thapa for casting cannons and making several other important things needed by department of defence;<sup>64</sup> but the total produce of these articles was sufficient. They were negligible before the vast stores of these things of the English. From Elles, Brevet Major E.R.'s "Confidential Report on Nepal," (Calcutta, 1884, p. 88), the English are found to have been using elephants besides horses in the war. The

Nepalese had to depend generally on bows and arrows and **Khukri** at several places. In some places we find them using merely pieces of stones against the enemies. Besides, there was no proper arrangement for reinforcement. Now let us turn our attention to the forts <sup>65</sup> which were essential for the protection of the country. They were not strongly built and the walls and roofs were like those of ordinary houses which could not remain safe after heavy firing on them. There was no proper arrangement for supplying them with proper provisions. At the time of war we find in several forts the soldiers could not get food and water also. There was not adequate provision for medical help to the troops on the Nepalese side. The Nepalese at one instant is found to have got medical aid from the English side and this was a great stroke of diplomacy on the part of the English side and by this way they were able to gain sympathy of the Nepalese troops also.<sup>67</sup> Even a small army with inferior types of weapons can face the enemy successfully; but this is not possible in open fields or from the forts. For it, the best system is guerrilla fighting. History presents several examples of the best results achieved by this type of fighting. Sivaji got success over the vast Moghul army with it. The North Koreans achieved much success only because of this type of fighting. In Vietnam the Americans are being harrassed by it. Nepal with abundant forests and hills were best suited for this warfare. To neglect such a sort of fighting was indeed a blunder committed by the military strategists of Nepal.

The English were financially strong also. They were in a position to get financial help or loan from different places. Thus we find that the English got two and a half crores of rupees from the Nawab of Oudh as a loan<sup>68</sup> and with this amount they could have sufficient number of troops as well as weapons; but such a help or loan was never available to the government of Nepal. In spite of her repeated appeals to the Chinese Emperor she was not able to get any military or financial help from China.

Another point which was responsible for the defeat of the Nepalese was that there was no arrangement in Nepal for giving political education among the people. Government could not create national consciousness in the minds of the people and without national consciousness the general mass could not be utilized for the cause of the country.

Next comes another important factor. The English were master propogandists and during the days of the war they carried on even false propoganda of their victory, and thus there was an attempt to demoralize the officers as well as the troops of Nepal on the one hand and encourage the Company's troops on the other.<sup>69</sup> Besides, by means of this propoganda an attempt was also made to gain the sympathy and co-operation of the deposed rulers of Nepal.<sup>70</sup> Leaflets were freely distributed. This type of machinery however, was unknown to Nepal. The Nepalese could not get even the correct information of the war through the government sources.

The policy of expansion and consolidation which had been adopted by the Nepalese from the time of Prithibi Narayan Shah would have alienated the sympathy of some petty rulers of Nepal. Because of this policy several deposed rulers are found to have taken shelter in India where they were encouraged by the officers of the Company to co-operate with it against the government of Nepal for getting back the lost throne and the prestige.<sup>71</sup> They impressed upon the latter that the defeat of Nepal was essential for their bright future. From the Company's side assurances were also not lacking that after victory would be achieved they would be given not only their lost places but also protection.<sup>72</sup> Because of this propoganda and the assurances it was but natural that many of the deposed rulers of Nepal whole heartedly co-operated with the English.<sup>73</sup> Ochterlony was permitted by his government to distribute arms freely among the hill inhabitants who had been disarmed by the Nepalese government.<sup>74</sup> Sansar

Chanda was also encouraged by the English to rise against the Nepal Government.<sup>75</sup> Even monetary help was given to the Nepalese and in this way many other Nepalese were won over to the English side.<sup>76</sup> According to W. C. Northey and C. J. Morris ("The Gurkhas," London, 1928, p. XIX), three regiments of the Gorkhas under the English supervision, were raised in the British Indian army. From the "Confidential Report on Nepal" (by Elles, Brevet Major E. R., Calcutta, 1884, p. 79), we find that, "Many of the Gorkhas took service with the British, and three battalions were at once formed."

In short lack of sufficient number of troops and weapons of the Nepalese, neglect of proper constructions of their forts, inefficiency in their supply of urgently needed food, water and medicine, absence of national spirit among the people, too much dependence on their defensive policy, non-introduction of their guerrilla type of fighting, non-availability of help to them from any other State, the introduction of vigorous propoganda of the English, presence of their vast number of troops, availability of co-operation to them from some of the deposed petty rulers of Nepal, and the existence of the intriguing atmosphere of the palace of Kathmandu were all responsible for the failure on the part of the Nepalese.

### *Foot Note:-*

1. Landon, p. 76.
2. Nepal, p. 237.
3. Woodbridge.
4. This version about the division of the troops is taken from Cavenagh, pp. 148-149. There are different versions about the number of troops. According to Fraser, (p. 14) Marley had under him 6,000 men, Wood 3,000, Gillespie 3,000 and Ochterlony 3,000. Smith's version (Vol. II, p. 2) is, under Ochterlony there were 6,000 men, Gillespie 3,500, Wood 4,500, Marley 8,000; Sharma opines (pp. 258-259) Ochterlony had 6,000 men, Gillespie 3,500, Wood 4,000 and Marley 7,907; Upadhaya writes (pp. 202-203) under Ochterlony there were 6,000, Gillespie 3,500, Wood 4,000, Marley 8,00; Gautam mentions, (p. 217) under Ochterlony there were 6,000 men, 3,500 under Gillespie, 4,000 under Wood, and 8,000 under Marley. According to the extracts of a local **Vamshabali**, under Marley there were 6,000, under Wood 3,500, under Gillespie 3,500 and under Ochterlony 12,000 men.
5. Smith, Vol. I, p. 218.
6. This version is taken from the available extracts of a **Vamshabali**.
7. Sanwal, p. 156.
8. Gyawali, p. 6. For the details of the Battle of Nalapani see Gyawali.
9. Fraser, p. 15.
10. Ibid, p. 17. The details of the English loss is also given on the same page. Commenting on the causes of the reverses of the English, Philips, C. H., in his book, "The East India Company 1784-1834," Manchester University Press, 1940, (p. 198), gives the following view:- "The British Officers were inexperienced in the organisation of warfare in the hills and, against the fine fighting qualities of the Gurkhas, they met at first with numerous reverses."

11. Sharma, p. 261.
12. Sanwal, p. 160. See Appendix No. 8.
13. Cavenagh, pp.166–167.
14. Fraser, p. 530. The intercepted letter addressed to Runjore from Gouree Shah (sic) dated 21 **Chaitra** contains the following “Your letter has been received, stating that the enemy has approached on the side of Rynka; that the battle was lost and himself taken prisoner; Captain Bulbhudder severely wounded, and many **jummadars** and soldiers killed that the enemy had surrounded the fort on all sides, and that the garrison were starving for want of food. To this I reply, the two kingly powers are at war. You have conquered in 10 or 12 battles and are renowned. The enemy have gained one action; what of that ? Do not be alarmed at having lost so many men, and being so completely surrounded. If you will live and stand at present you will gain a thousand battles more. If you feel want of confidence and despair in Jytock, the Goorkhas will be slain scattered about as they are. If you stand out at Jytock, reinforcement will come from the east, and all united drive away the English if they were a thousand nations.”
15. Cavenagh, pp. 171–172.
16. Fraser, p. 24; Mani, p. 28.
17. Fraser, p. 25.
18. Ibid, p. 26; Mani, p. 29.
19. Fraser, p. 20.
20. Cavenagh, p. 153; PRN, pp. 376–377. When Birhurwa was captured by the English this letter was intercepted from Chandra Sekhar Upadhaya who was sent by the king of Nepal to contact the English authority. For details see Appendix No. 3.
21. Cavenagh, p. 153.
22. Fraser, pp. 20–21.
23. Smith, Vol. I, p. 260.
24. Fraser, p. 22.

25. Smith, Vol. I, pp. 266–267.
26. Fraser, p. 22.
27. Smith, Vol. I, p. 277.
28. Cavenagh, p. 189.
29. Fraser, p. 44.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid, p. 45.
32. Ibid.
33. Cavenagh, p. 190.
34. Ibid. pp.191–192.
35. Ibid, p. 193.
36. PRN, p. 414.
37. Cavenagh, p. 193.
38. Fraser, p. 48.
39. Cavenagh, p. 171 .
40. Extracts from a local **Vamshabali**.
41. Cavenagh, p. 171.
42. Fraser, p. 13.
43. Ibid.
44. Smith, Vol. II, p. 8.
45. Fraser, pp. 38–39.
46. Ibid, p. 39.
47. IP, Vol. I, pp. 26–36.
48. Fraser, p. 41.
49. Ibid.
50. Smith, Vol. II, p. 12.
51. Fraser, p. 42.
52. Cavenagh, p. 186.
53. Ibid, pp. 186–187. From the intercepted letter ( Fraser, pp. 522–526 and Sanwal, pp. 167–172 ) it is clear that the Nepalese were well aware of the evil designs of the English and also their determination to fight for self defence.
54. PRN, pp. 607–608; Sanwal, pp. 312–313.
55. Smith, Vol. II, pp. 22–23.
56. Cavenagh, p. 197.
57. Smith, Vol. II, p. 23.

58. Cavenagh, pp. 197–198.
59. Ibid, p. 197.
60. Ibid, p. 198.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid, p. 199.
63. Fraser, p. 526. In the intercepted letter we find a draft of a petition addressed to the Chinese Emperor. From this letter we see that Nepal had requested China for assistance against the English. For details see Appendix No. 9; Regarding the Sino–Nepal relation, Woodyatt, N. G., in his book “History of the 3rd Queen Alexandra’s Own Gurkha Rifles 1815–1927,” London, 1929, ( p. 2.) mentions that, “Apparently they only demanded some nominal offerings and an acknowledgement of China’s suzerainty; in token of which a deputation used to proceed to Peking from Kathmandu every five year to renew the assurances of allegiance and good faith.”
64. Political consultations, March 7, 1796, No. 44; IPS, p. 34; Chaudhuri, p. 93.
65. **Poornima**, 1/3, p, 62; Gyawali, p. 4. We find that the forts were not properly constructed. The fort of Nalapani is the typical model.
66. PRN, p. 27; **Poornima**, 1/3, p. 62; Gyawali, p. 27.
67. Gyawali, pp. 52–54.
- 68, **Poornima**, 1/1, p. 48.
69. PRN, pp. 247–249.
70. Ibid, pp. 44–47, 270, 376; **Poornima**, 1/1, p. 51, 53.
71. PRN. p. 66.
72. Ibid, pp. 237–238, pp. 249–260, 344–345. From this letter we get the information that Amar Singh Thapa and his sons were interested in joining the English side provided they got the lands and the revenues which they used to get from the Government of Nepal. For details see Appendix No. 2; Woodyatt, N. G., in his book, “ History of the 3rd Queen Alexandra’s Own Gurkha Rifles 1815–1927,” London, 1929, (pp. 8–9) writes that even the disbanded Gorkhas were enlisted in the British Army

“The Kumaon Battalion” which was formed on the 24th of April 1815, and consisted of three bodies of men:—  
“ (1) Enemy subjects, i. e., disbanded Gurkhas, etc, who joined the British after Ochterlony’s Victory at Deothal. (2) 300 Oudh and Palpa men from Gorukpur who had been employed by the British against the Nepalese (3) Some Gurkhas and others who entered our service after the fighting round Almora.” From this we can see that the English had encouraged to utilise the Nepalese traitors in their newly formed Battalion to fight against the Nepalese Government.

73. Fraser, p. 529. In the translation of a letter from Runjore Singh Thapa, Commander in Jytuck, to Gouree Shah, written on the 10th of Chaitra or the 4th of April which was intercepted contains the following :— “ Your letter is received and understood; you write that “others are ungrateful, dastardly and treacherous. I will support the Peeoothana name, and prove true.” In such times when you write so, I am highly gratified. By the favour of god, when this danger is past, you shall receive all honours, dress, drums and colours, and be promoted and the other officers under you equally rewarded. Kishna Ooperettee Soubahdar is gone to deceive and turn you aside; call him to you by any means or method, and shoot him. By doing so you will greatly please me. Uzumba Pant Qazee did not choose a happy hour nor consulted properly. He fought and lost an action, even he is taken a prisoner, but we are from that more confident and not dispirited. We will cut to pieces and drive away our foes. Be on all points at rest and confident. I send you four rupees, the present for the ensuring festival.”

74. PRN, pp. 73–74.

75. Ibid. pp. 69–70.

76. Ibid. pp. 154–155; Fraser, p. 530. From the following intercepted letter we get the information how the patriot Nepalese felt about the

Nepalese traitors:- Letter from Sheamul Soubahdar, his cousin, to Gouree Shah, Commander of Mornee dated the 4th April, or, the 10th Chaitra, reveals the following:- "What you write, that Lal Sah is a traitor and has disgraced all the Rajpoots, is true; you desire me to speak to Runjore to prevent the wives and families of Dumbear Sahee, Ureemur Dan Sahee, and Purtab Sahee, being seized, when the wife and family of Lal Sahee is put in confinement. The Qazee recollects this, and will pay attention, but he says the criminals alone shall suffer. Lal Sahee is a traitor and ungrateful and has sent his ancestors from heaven to hell. He has lost his name and cast. The Goorkha empire is not to be overthrown. Be strong in your position and faithful to your trust; recollect your name and ancestry."

APPENDIX E

General Return of the army under Sir D. Ochterlony present with corps by the Returns of January 1816.  
Statement of Artillery attached to columns for the Campaign of 1815-16.

General Return of the Division of the army under the command of Major-General Sir D. Ochterlony, in the Nepal Campaign of 1815-16, exhibiting the numbers present with Corps by the Returns for January 1816.

CORPS	Staff Officers				European Officers		Ordnance Acting Deputy Commissary	Native medical Doctors	Native Commissioned European and Non-commissioned Officers. And Rank and File								
	Generals	Colonels & Commanding Brigades	General Staff	Commissariat Staff	Medical Staff	Regimental			Regimental Staff	Staff Sergeants	Native Officers		Sergeants or Havildars		Rank and File		
											Present	Sick	Present	Sick	Present	Sick	
General Staff	1		4	5	2											12	
Engineers						4										4	
European Artillery						18	1					10		187	5	221	
Golaundauze									4	9		31		401	5	446	
Gun Lascahs										8		18		750	35	809	
Ordnance Drivers												26		605	5	636	
Pioneers						4	2	3	4	6		9		399		427	
First Rohillah Cavalry (5 Risalahs)						1								500		501	
Right Column, First Brigade, Colonel																3,040	
Kelly, H. M. 24th Foot																	
H. M. 24th Foot						27	3		2			42		849	38	961	
1st Battalion, 18th Native																	
Infantry						13	3	2	2	12		29	4	747	53	865	
Right Wing, 1st Battalion																	
21st Native Infantry						6		1	1	9		25		390	28	460	
Left Wing, 2nd Battalion, 21st																	
Native Infantry						5		1	1	9		25		437	40	518	
Chumparun light Infantry						6	2	2	2	17	1	66	3	1,246	58	1,397	
																4,201	
Centre Column:- Major-General Sir D. Ochterlony, Commanding. Third Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, 37th foot. 4th Brigade Colonel Dick, 9th Native Infantry:-																	
H. M. 87th Foot						16	4		2			46		676	61	805	
2nd Battalion, 4th Native Infantry						6	3	2	2	9		23	8	784	68	905	
2nd Battalion, 8th Native Infantry						5	2	2	2	14		35	4	784	74	925	
2nd Battalion, 9th Native Infantry						5	3	2	2	19		45	1	810	42	925	
2nd Battalion, 12th Native Infantry						7	3	2	2	16		43	1	894	35	1,003	
2nd Battalion, 15 Native Infantry						6	3	2	2	13		30	1	805	35	897	
2nd Battalion, 22 Native Infantry						10	3	2	2	10	1	27		860	9	924	
2nd Battalion, 25 Native Infantry						8	2	2	2	14	2	44	1	815	77	967	
Right Wing 1st Battalion 13th Native Infantry						5	1	1	1	10		25		425	20	488	
																7,843	
Left Column- 2nd Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Nicoll, 66th Foot-																	
H. M. 66th Foot						30	4		2			42	1	762	42	887	
5th Grenadier Battalion						11	2	2	2	16		24	3	627	41	738	
8th " "						12	3	2	2	15		36	8	688	73	839	
1st Battalion, 8th Native Infantry						11	3	2	2	14	1	43	1	124	69	890	
2nd Battalion, 18th Native Infantry						5	3	2	2	18		41	1	744	30	926	
																4,280	
Brigade Staff-																	
1st Brigade																	
2nd Do		1	3														
3rd Do		1	3														
4th Do		1	2														
		1	2														
Total	1	4	14	5	2	221	49	1	32	43	238	5	795	37	17,016	935	19,394
Grand Total		26				270	1	32	45	243		832		17,951		19,394	



**Statement of Artillery attached  
to the Different columns in the Nepal  
Campaign of  
1815–16**

**Setapore Column—Colonel Nicolls  
Battery Train**

Four 18–pounder iron guns.  
Four 24–pounder iron carronades.  
Four tumbrils for the iron pieces.  
Two tumbrils for the carronades.

**Light Train**

Two 12–pounder brass guns.  
Six 6–pounder do. do.  
Two 5½–inch brass howitzers.  
Two 4¾–inch do do.  
Sixteen tumbrils, one to each piece.  
Three tumbrils extra for the 6– pounders.

**Main Column—Major—General Ochterlony  
Battery Train**

One ten inch mortar.  
Four 8–inch mortars.  
Eight 5½–inch do.  
Two 8–inch howitzers.  
Eight iron 18–pounders.  
Twenty tumbrils with platform carts, and spare carriages.

**Light Field Train  
For one Brigade Infantry**

One 12–pounders.  
Three 6–pounders.  
One 5½–inch howitzers.  
One 4¾– do do.  
Eight tumbrils.

### **For Seven Brigades more**

Seven 12-pounders.

Twenty-one 6-pounders.

Seven 5½ inch howitzers.

Seven 4½ do do.

Forty-six tumbrils.

Spare tumbrils of ammunition for the 6-pounders at one to every two guns=eleven tumbrils.

### **Mountain Train**

Twelve mountain pieces consisting of 4¾ inch mortars and howitzers.

The preparation of the above ordnance was left to the discretion of the General Officer Commanding the division, the partial or total employment being left entirely to his judgement.

### **Gorakhpur Division - Major General J. S. Wood**

Two 18-pounders.

Two 12-pounders.

Two 5½-inch howitzers.

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## TREATY OF SUGAULI

In the previous chapter a critical survey of the war has been made. There it has been seen that the Nepalese could not stand before the vast English force and as a result they were forced to come to terms. Now let us analyse and examine the various efforts made by both the parties to come to an honourable settlement.

On the 29th October 1815,<sup>1</sup> the Nepalese negotiators left for Kathmandu, and declared that they would return to Sugauli within twelve days with the Treaty duly signed. Gajraj arrived at Sugauli on the 28th of November, 1815<sup>2</sup> and, "signed the treaty according to the draft submitted to his court, by the terms of which, the ratification of the **Rajah** (sic) was to be delivered within fifteen days."<sup>3</sup>

In the meantime active preparations were in progress in the English camp for renewed hostility. The Nepalese had taken position in the Tarai.<sup>4</sup> On the other side General Ochterlony had been summoned from the north-west to assume the command of the army which was to advance to Kathmandu.<sup>5</sup> On the 5th January, 1816, Ochterlony "was vested with exclusive powers to direct all political negotiations and arrangements with relation to the Government of Nepal."<sup>6</sup> The period for the ratification came and expired but to no avail. Besides that active preparations were in progress for the renewed hostility.

Colonel Nicolls had been succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Adams in Kumaon from where

he was to advance and the former considerably reinforced with General Wood's army was to operate against the frontiers of Butwal and Palpa.

General Ochterlony had under him 33, 446 men.<sup>8</sup> It was divided into four divisions, "the first under General Ochterlony assembled near Segowlee (sic) and consisted of 19,394 of all ranks; The second commanded by Colonel Nicolls was collected at Seetapore in Oude (sic), with a view to the invasion of the provinces at Dootee, Acham and Saliana and mustered 6,617. The third of 4,946 was merely intended as a corps of observation to be employed under Major General J. S. Wood on the Gorukhpore frontier; and the fourth which ought rather to be styled a detachment, its strength being only 2,489 was placed under the orders of Captain Latter for the purpose of invading Morung province."<sup>9</sup> On the Nepalese side the troops were about 2,000.<sup>10</sup>

The main division was divided into four brigades commanded respectively by Colonels Kelly, Nicolls, Miller and Dick. Colonel Kelly and his men "were detached to the right by Bhugwanpoor, with orders to penetrate, if possible by Hurrehurpoor; Lieutenant Colonel Nicolls was similarly directed on Ramnughur to the left, while Sir David Ochterlony with the other two brigades moved straight through the forest by Simlabassa (sic) to the foot of the Bicheea Koh pass."<sup>11</sup>

Colonel Miller's brigade was led by the General himself and they discovered a passage which was unknown to the Nepalese. On the 14th February they started the march and on the 15th the English "encamped within sight of the Goorka posts, commanding the direct road over the Churiaghati."<sup>12</sup>

When the Nepalese came to know about the General's movement they retreated to Mackwanpur without further delay. On the 20th the two brigades under General Ochterlony and Colonel Dick met at Etounda

(probably Hitauda) on the banks of the Raptree.<sup>13</sup> On the 27th the two brigades reached and encamped at Mackwanpur. Lieutenant Colonel Burnett with his brigade also joined them. On that very day the Nepalese troops made an attack on the detached post called Sekha Khutree. The loss of the Nepalese side according to Woodbridge was 800 men.<sup>14</sup> Mackwanpur fell into the English hands. This news was followed by another defeat of the Nepalese at the fort of Hurriarpur by Brigadier Kelly. "Runjore, the defender of Jaituck (sic) forfeited all the renown by an early flight."<sup>15</sup>

The news of the first defeat at Mackwanpur spread rapidly in Kathmandu. "The red seal was affixed in haste to the "Treaty of Sugoulee (sic), and an envoy sent to the Camp of Sir David Ochterlony to notify that it was ready for delivery."<sup>16</sup> Kaji Bakhtawar Singh, the Nepalese Commander, wrote to the General requesting him to permit him to send the instrument through Chandra Sekhar Upadhaya who was stated to have come to Mackwanpur specially for that purpose.

Chandra Sekhar Upadhaya appeared in the camp on March 3, 1816 <sup>17</sup> and entreated Ochterlony to accept the ratified treaty. General Ochterlony explained to Chandra Sekhar Upadhaya that "the letter of the treaty would give to the British all the territory in their occupation, and would now therefore include the Valley of the Raptree as well as Hetounda and Hurreehurpoor. At the same time the Opadheea was assured that he must no longer expect any concession beyond the letter, and he was called upon to give a specific note in writing declaratory of his being influenced by no such hopes, and further to engage that the Raja (sic) should specifically confirm the declaration in a letter to the Governor-General."<sup>18</sup> Chandra Sekhar readily assented to this. After this Ochterlony "concluded the treaty and despatched Lieutenant Boileau of his staff to act as Resident at Kathmandoo (sic) until the Governor-General should nominate a proper officer."<sup>19</sup> Ochterlony left the hills

after having ascertained that the forts of Nagree and Nagarkot were to be surrendered to the **Rajah** of Sikkim.<sup>20</sup>

This peace treaty which had been drafted in Sugauli on December 2, 1815 was accepted as a treaty only on March 4, 1816.<sup>21</sup> The following were the terms of the Treaty:—

“TREATRY OF SUGAULI, DEC. 2, 1815 <sup>22</sup>

“Treaty of Peace between the Honourable East India Company and **Maharajah** Bikram Sah, **Rajah** of Nipal, settled between Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw on the part of the Honourable Company, in virtue of the full powers vested in him by His Excellency the Right Honourable Francis, Earl of Moira, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, one of His Majesty’s Most Honourable Privy Council, appointed by the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company, to direct and control all the affairs of the East Indies, and by **Sree Gooroo** Gujraj Misser and Chunder Seekur Opedeea on the part of **Maharajah** Girmaun Jode Bikram Sah Bahuader Shumsheer Jung, in virtue of the powers to that effect vested in them by the said **Rajah** of Nipal.

Whereas war has arisen between the Honourable East India Company and the **Rajah** of Nipal, and whereas the parties are mutually disposed to restore the relations of peace and amity which, previously to the occurrence of the late differences, had long subsisted between the two States, the following terms of peace have been agreed upon:—

**Article 1st**

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable East India Company and the **Rajah** of Nipal.

**Article 2nd**

The **Rajah** of Nipal renounces all claim to the lands which were the subject of discussion bet-

ween the two States before the war; and acknowledges the right of the Honourable Company to the sovereignty of those lands.

### Article 3rd

The **Rajah** of Nipal hereby cedes to the Honourable East India Company in perpetuity all the under-mentioned territories, namely:—

- First                      The whole of the low lands between the River Kali and Rapti.
- Secondly                The whole of the low lands (with the exception of Bootwul Khass) lying between the Rapti and Gunduck.
- Thirdly                  The whole of the low lands between the Gunduck and the Coosah, in which the authority of the British Government has been introduced, or is in actual course of introduction.
- Fourthly                All the low lands between the Rivers Mitchee and the Teestah.
- Fifthly                  All the territories within the hills eastward of the River Mitchee, including the fort and lands of Nagree and the Pass of Nagarcote leading from Morung into the hills, together with the territory lying between that Pass and Nagree. The aforesaid territory shall be evacuated by the Gurkha troops within forty days from this date.

### Article 4th

With a view to indemnify the Chiefs and **Barahdars** of the State of Nipal, whose interests will suffer by the alienation of the lands ceded by the foregoing Article, the British Government agrees to settle pensions to the aggregate amount of two lakhs of rupees per annum on such Chiefs as may be selected by the **Rajah** of Nipal,

and in the proportions which the **Rajah** may fix. As soon as the selection made, **Sunnuds** shall be granted under the seal and signature of the Governor-General for the pensions respectively.

#### **Article 5th**

The **Rajah** of Nipal renounces for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claim to or connection with the countries lying to west of the River Kali, and engages never to have any concern with those countries or the inhabitants thereof.

#### **Article 6th**

The **Rajah** of Nipal engages never to molest or disturb the **Rajah** of Sikkim in the possession of his territories; but agrees, if any differences shall arise between the State of Nipal and the **Rajah** of Sikkim, or the subjects of either, that such differences shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government, by whose award the **Rajah** of Nipal engages to abide.

#### **Article 7th**

The **Rajah** of Nipal hereby engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European and American State, without the consent of the British Government.

#### **Article 8th**

In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the two States, it is agreed that accredited Ministers from each shall reside at the Court of the other.

#### **Article 9th**

This treaty, consisting of nine Articles, shall be ratified by the **Rajah** of Nipal within fifteen days from this date, and the ratification shall be delivered

o Lieutenant Colonel Bradshaw, who engages to obtain and deliver to the **Rajah** the ratification of the Governor-General within twenty days, or sooner, if practicable.

Done at Segowlee on the 2nd day of December 1815.  
(signed)

Paris Bradshaw, Lt. Col. P. A.

Ratified by the Governor-General in Council at Fort William in Bengal, this ninth day of December One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifteen.

(Signed)

By His Excellency  
the Governor-General-in-Council.

J. Adams,  
Secretary to the  
Government

Moira-  
Bedmonsdone-  
Archd. Seton-  
Geo. Dowdiswell-

Received this Treaty from Chunder Seekur Opedeea, Agent on the part of the **Rajah** of Nipal, in the valley of Muckwanpoor, at half past two o'clock p.m., on the 4th of March 1816, and delivered to him the Counterpart Treaty on behalf of the British Government.

Dd. Ochterlony,  
Agent, Governor-General."

From this Treaty we can see that the draft which had been made on December was approved from the Nepalese side and handed over to the English on the 4th March, 1816. The same Treaty was modified by the memorandum presented to the Nepalese Government by the Company's Government on December 8, 1816<sup>23</sup> and the Nepalese Government accepted the same under the red seal on December 11, 1816<sup>24</sup> in connection with the cession

of the Tarai land between the Kosi and the Rapti to the Company's Government. The following substance of a letter for the restoration of the Tarai under the red seal received from the **Durbar** both dated the 11th of December, 1816,<sup>25</sup> clarifies the above statement.

“Memorandum for the approval and acceptance of the **Rajah** of Nepal presented on the 8th December, 1816.


1. Adverting to the amity and confidence subsisting with the **Rajah** of Nipal, the British Government proposes to suppress, as much as is possible the execution of certain Articles in the Treaty of Segowlee, which bear hard upon the **Rajah**, as follows:—
2. With a view to gratify the **Rajah** in a point which he has much at heart, the British Government is willing to restore the Terai ceded to it by the **Rajah** in the Treaty, to wit, the whole Terai lands lying between the Rivers Coosa and Gunduck, such as appertained to the **Rajah** before the late disagreement; excepting the disputed lands in the **Zillahs** of Tirhoot and Sarun, and accepting such portions of territory as may occur on both sides for the purpose of settling a frontier, upon investigation by the respective Commissioners; and excepting such lands as may have been given in possession to any one by the British Government upon ascertainment of his rights subsequent to the cession of Terai to that Government. In case the **Rajah** is desirous of retaining the lands of such ascertained proprietors, they may be exchanged for others, and let it be clearly understood that, notwithstanding the considerable extent of the lands in the **Zillah** of Tirhoot, which have for a long time been a subject of dispute, the settlement made in the year 1812 of Christ, corresponding with the year 1869 of **Bikramajeet**, shall be taken, and everything else relinquished, that is to say, that the settlement and negotiations, such as occurred at that period, shall in present case hold good and be established.

3. The British Government is willing likewise to restore the Terai lying between the Rivers Gunduk and Rapti, that is to say, from the River Gunduk to the western limits of the **Zillah** of Goruckpore, together with Bootwul and Sheeraj, such as appertained to Nipal previous to the disagreements, complete, with the exception of the disputed places in the Terai, and such quantity of ground as may be considered mutually to be requisite for the new boundary.
4. As it is impossible to establish desirable limits between the two States without survey, it will be expedient that Commissioners be appointed on both sides for the purpose of arranging in concert a well defined boundary on the basis of the preceding terms, and of establishing a straight line of frontier, with a view to the distinct separation of the respective territories of the British Government to the south and of Nipal to the north; and in case any indentations occur to destroy the even tenor of the line, the Commissioners should effect an exchange of lands so interfering on principles of clear reciprocity.
5. And should it occur that the proprietors of lands situated on the mutual frontier, as it may be rectified, whether holding of the British Government or of the **Rajah** of Nipal, should be placed in the condition of subjects to both Governments, with a view to prevent continual dispute and discussion between the two Governments, the respective Commissioners should effect in mutual concurrence and co-operation the exchange of such lands, so as to render them subject to one dominion alone.
6. Whensoever the Terai shall be restored, the **Rajah** of Nipal will cease to acquire a sum of two lakhs of Rupees per annum, which the British Government agreed to advance for the maintenance of certain **Barahdars** of his Government.
7. Moreover, the **Rajah** of Nipal agrees to refrain from prosecuting any inhabitants of the Terai, after its rever-

tance to his rule, on account of having favoured the cause of the British Government during the war, and should any of those persons, excepting the cultivators of the soil, be desirous of quitting their estates, and of retiring within the Company's territories, he shall not be liable to hindrance.

8. In the event of the **Rajah's** approving the foregoing terms, the proposed arrangement for the survey and establishment of boundary marks shall be carried into execution, and after the determination in concert of the boundary line, **Sunnuds** conformable to the foregoing stipulations, drawn out and sealed by the two States, shall be delivered and accepted on both sides.

Edward Gardner,  
Resident.



(A true translation)

(Sd) G. Wellesely,  
Assistant.

“Substance of a Letter for the restoration of the Terai under the Seal of **Rajah** of Gorkha received on the 11th December 1816.

After Compliments;

I have comprehended the document under date the 8th December 1816, or the 4th of **Poos** 1837 **Sumbut**, which you transmitted relative to the restoration, with a view to my friendship and satisfaction, of the Terai between the Rivers Coosa and Rapti to the southern boundary complete, such as appertained to my estate previous to the war. It mentioned that in the event of my accepting the terms contained in that document, the southern boundary of the Terai should be established as it was held by this Government, I have accordingly agreed to the terms laid down by you, and herewith enclose an instrument of agree-

ment, which may be satisfactory to you. Moreover, it was written in the document transmitted by you, that it should be restored, with the exception of the disputed lands and such portion of land as should, in the opinion of the Commissioners on both sides, occur for the purpose of settling a boundary; and excepting the lands which, after the cessions of the Terai to the Honourable Company, may have been transferred by it to the ascertained proprietors. My friend, all these matters rest with you, and since it was also written that a view was had to my friendship and satisfaction with respect to certain Articles of the Treaty of Segowlee, which bore hard upon me, and which could be remitted, I am well assured that you have at heart the removal of whatever may tend to my distress, and that you will act in a manner corresponding to the advantage of this State and the increase of friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.

Moreover, I have to acknowledge the receipt of the orders under the red seal of this State, addressed to the officers of the Terai between the Rivers Gunduk and Rapti, for the surrender of that Terai, and their retiring from thence, which was given to you at Thankote, according to your request, and which you have now returned for my satisfaction.

(A true translation.)

(Sd) G. Wellesley,  
Assistant."

"Substance of a document under the Red Seal, received from Durbar, on the 11th December 1816.

<p><b>Durga</b> <b>Bhowanee</b></p>
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With a regard to friendship and amity, the Government of Nipal agrees to the tenor of the document under date the 8th of December 1816 or the 4th Pooos 1873

**Sumbut** which was received by the **Durbar** from the Honou-  
rable Edward Gardner on the part of the Honourable Com-  
pany, respecting the revertance of the Terai between the  
Rivers Coosa and Rapti to the former southern boundary  
such as appertained to Nipal previous to the War, with  
exception of the disputed lands.

Dated the 7th of **Poos** 1873 **Sumbut**.

(A true Translation.)

(Sd) G. Wellesley,  
Assistant."

*Foot Note:-*

1. Smith, Vol. II, p.29.
2. Cavenagh, p. 202.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid, p. 203.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, p. 204.
7. Smith, Vol. II, p. 24.
8. Cavenagh, p. 204.
9. Ibid, pp. 204-205.
10. Ibid, p. 208.
11. Smith, Vol. II, p. 55.
12. Woodbridge.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Smith, Vol. II, p. 65.
18. Ibid, pp. 65-66.
19. Ibid, p. 66.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid, p. 65.
22. IPS, pp. 13-15; IPSP, pp. 81-84, 86-87, 88-90; Aitchison, Vol XIV, pp. 54-56.
23. IPS, pp. 15-17; IPSP, pp. 128-129; Aitchison, Vol. XIV, pp. 57-58
24. IPS, pp. 17-18; IPSP, p. 129; Aitchison, Vol. XIV, pp. 58-59.
25. IPS, p. 18; IPSP, p.129; Aitchison, Vol XIV, pp. 58-59.

## RESULTS OF THE WAR

The Treaty of Sugauli produced important effects on both the Nepalese and the English. The Nepalese had to suffer a great loss due to this war. They suffered in men, money and territory. Actually the Nepalese were not expecting a war so soon. When the British were thus so determined to have the war with Nepal the latter had no alternative but to meet the English challenge. Although inferior to the English in economic and military resources the Nepalese fought gallantly. Their bravery got commendation not only from the people of Nepal but also from their adversary.<sup>1</sup>

This war was greatly disastrous to Nepal. The history of Nepal from the middle of the eighteenth century is an account of the different stages of the unification of our country. Before the Anglo-Nepalese War the kingdom of Nepal extended from the Teesta on the east to the Sutlej on the west.<sup>2</sup> On the south the decadant state of the Nawab of Oudh was helping a lot in the realisation of the cherished goal. But unfortunately for Nepal the northern and western part of Oudh was occupied by Lord Wellesley. From then the policy of the British was not only check the Nepalese advance from the north but also to secure some of the hill territories of Nepal on the west.

As a result Anglo-Nepalese conflict became inevitable. The war was a question of time and it broke out in 1814. It resulted in the territorial loss of Nepal

on the south, east and west.<sup>3</sup> Nepal was surrounded on all sides by the British territories, and Nepal became a land locked country. The only consolation for the Nepalese was that Nepal was able to retain her independence even at a heavy cost. According to Lord Moira Nepal suffered the loss of half of her territories.<sup>4</sup>

One important effect of the war was that it changed the Nepalese mind. The Nepalese being very brave, they possess special fascination for joining the army service. After the Treaty of Sugauli they no longer had to fight with a foreign enemy. Then the energies of the Nepalese nobles were diverted from the external to internal affairs and they began to struggle with one another for political power and influence in the court. The factional conflicts led to mutual destruction culminating in the **Kot Massacre** of 1846.<sup>5</sup>

The Anglo-Nepalese War made the position of the East India Company on the north secure, because there was no longer any fear of the combinations of the Kingdoms of Burma (which controlled Assam to the east of Sikkim), Nepal & the Punjab.

The English gained victory in the war at a heavy cost. This subjected Lord Hastings' conduct of the war to severe criticism from the authorities in England and Lord Hastings had to send a long letter to them in his defence.<sup>6</sup>

Although the English had to suffer greatly in men and money, yet, on the whole, they were more than compensated for by the victory.<sup>7</sup> The territories which the English had gained in this war became very useful to her. Dehra Dun and Almorah became a recruiting place. Simla was made a summer capital by the English after the shifting of the seat of government from Calcutta to Delhi in 1912. The importance of the occupation of the province of Kumaon has been stated by Lord Moira in his letter

to the Secret Committee dated the 20th July, 1815.<sup>8</sup>

The occupation of Kumaon by the English was a great benefit to them. From Kumaon vigilance could be kept on the whole of the Nepalese territory.<sup>9</sup> Besides the Company was to have income from its revenues, mines and timbers.<sup>10</sup> From this province British manufactured goods could go to China. Politically speaking this war decided the fates of important and petty rules of India. Thus, **Ranjit Singh could not think of the expansion of his territory towards that of the East India Company.** Several families of the hill chiefs accepted the terms of the feudal allegiance to the Company.<sup>11</sup> Verily, this was brought an end to the hopes of the Indian Princes for gaining independence by taking the help of arms.

The British desire of establishing a British Residency at Kathmandu was at last fulfilled. It should however be noted that the British Resident could not interfere in the affairs of Nepal. Although he was called a Resident his position was more or less like that of an ambassador.

The Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-1816 was the first and Last war between the English and the Nepalese. The peace which followed it secured for the British Government an unceasing flow of recruits for the defence of her Empire. In short, the English got what they desired, i.e., Nepal lost those territories which were of great strategical importance to her. The English never thought of bringing the whole of Nepal under their direct control. They wanted to make it smaller in size and thus weak.<sup>12</sup> They adopted this policy because they realised the impossibility of keeping the whole hilly country under their control. They realised that the hilly areas would not bring them financial gains while they would have to spend a lot on the vast army which would be required for maintaining peace and tranquility there.<sup>13</sup>

Even though the Nepalese had to suffer so much losses they did not make any effort to learn the advanced technology of the West. Association with the English after the war rendered them ample opportunity to remove their defects by introducing advanced scientific and technological ideas of the West. Japan was also defeated by the European powers and her ambition was checked. But Japan being a practical nation, they tried to know the secret of the enemy's strength. They learnt the European economic, industrial, educational and military system and became as progressive as the West and as a result they were able to raise Japan to the position of a great Asiatic power. But the Nepalese do not seem to have possessed such an insight and Nepal continued to be as backward as before. The economic distress compelled the brave hillmen of Nepal to leave their home to become Gorkha mercenaries in the British Indian Army.<sup>14</sup> The only result that is obvious is that the Nepalese aristocrats have been able to enjoy the comforts provided by the modern civilization. It should however be noted that the Anglo-Nepalese relation since 1816 has been marked by friendship and cordiality.

*Foot Note:—*

1. Forbes, p. 50; Pathak, p. 12. The determination, bravery, will for sacrifice and patriotic feelings are found in the following intercepted letters from Fraser (p.529).

Letter from Gowree Shah to Kishna Oopurettee dated the 8th Chaitra Burwar:— (A) “You ask a reply to the letter you have sent. I have replied once, which is as good as a hundred times. I have said and still say, until Raj gurbh and Jytock fall, I will answer you with powder and ball. I have plenty of it.”

(B) Letter from the same to Lal Sahee, his nephew, and Kishna Oopurettee’s father both in Colonel Ochterlony’s camp, dated the 6th Chaitra:— “What you write, that I am a Rajah’s son whose family has been destroyed by the Ghoorkhas, and that it did not become me to hold out in the fort, is answered that I am a son of a Rajpoot I have eaten their salt, and will not disgrace my family’s name nor my own name.

If you suppose you will find me alive you are mistaken; you may find my corpse. I am born of a Rajpoot: I am as such prepared to die, and thereby attain a happy regeneration.”

(C) Letter from the same to Dhannee Ram, of the same date:— “Lal Sahee sent you here, and caused you much trouble. What I first wrote to Lal Sahee, I wished merely to know whether he had or not gone over; now I know he has, and has also disgraced his house and ancestry.

This I will not do. If I survive, I shall be fortunate; if I am slain, my state will be happy. Until Jytock and Raj ghur fall, do not talk to me of surrender, I have eaten of Ghoorkha’s salt, and have ammunition and all manner of supplies.”

2. Refer Treaty of Sugauli.
3. Chatterji, p. 22; Forbes, p. 49; Keith, p. 119.

4. PRN, p. 673.
5. Landon, p. 119.
6. PRN, pp. 992-998. See Appendix No. 7.
7. See Appendix No. 7.
8. See Appendix No. 5.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Fraser, p. 529-530.
12. PRN, pp. 547-550.
13. Ibid. The intercepted letter of Amar Singh Thapa shows the courage and determination of the Nepalese to fight to the last for the cause of the independence of their country. This indicates the English did not desire to control Nepal directly. See Appendix No. 10.
14. Forbes, p. 51; Pathak, p. 11.

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## APPENDIX-1

The following draft of the Treaty has been taken from the "Papers Respecting The Nepaul War." It seems that this draft was prepared immediately after the outbreak of the War on the 1st Nov. 1814. But we find no mention of this draft any where else. This draft throws light on the real motive of the English towards Nepal.\*

### DRAFT

Remarks on the Draft of a Treaty of Peace with Nepaul.

Treaty of Peace between the Honourable East India Company and the **Maha Rajah** of Nepaul, settled between Major Paris Bradshaw on the part of the Honourable Company, in virtue of the full powers vested in him by His Excellency the Right Honourable Francis Earl of Moira, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, one of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, appointed by the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all their Affairs in the East-Indies, and by——

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\* PRN, pp, 262-265

on the part of **Maha Rajah,**  
& C (insert titles), in virtue  
of powers to that effect ves-  
ted in them by the said **Rajah**  
of Nepaul.

Requires no remark.

Whereas war has arisen bet-  
ween the Honourable East  
India Company and the **Rajah**  
of Nepaul, and whereas the  
parties are mutually disposed  
to restore the relations of  
peace and amity which, pre-  
viously to the occurrence of  
the late differences, have  
long subsisted between the  
two States, the following  
terms of peace have been  
agreed upon.

Article 1.—Requires no re-  
mark. Every means will, of  
course, be taken to expedite  
the conveyance of the informa-  
tion of the conclusion of peace  
to distant quarters.

Article 1.—There shall be  
perpetual peace and friend-  
ship between the Honourable  
East-India Company and the  
Government of Nepaul, and  
hostilities shall cease in all  
quarters, immediately on the  
receipt of information of the  
conclusion of this Treaty,  
intelligence of which shall be  
expedited by every practicable  
means.

Article 2.—This article is in-  
dispensable, and can admit of  
no qualification

Article 2.—The **Rajah** of Ne-  
paul, hereby renounces, for  
himself, and his heirs and  
successors, for ever, all claims  
to this disputed lands, which

have for some time past been the subject of discussion between the two States, and acknowledges the right of the Honourable Company to the Sovereignty of the whole of those lands.

Article 3.—The object of this article is sufficiently expressed in the body of the draft. The Governor-General holds it to be indispensable, that the Nepaulese shall agree to deliver up Munraj, who is charged with the murder of our officers in cold blood, as the most appropriate atonement for that atrocious outrage.

Article 3.—Whereas Munraj Foujdar, an officer in the service of the Nepaulese Government, stands charged with the atrocious murder in cold blood of the police officers of the British Government in Bootwul, an act which, by precluding further amicable discussion between the two States, was the immediate cause of the war; the **Rajah** of Nepal hereby agrees to surrender Munraj Foujdar into the hands of the British commanding officer, within days, in order that the said Munraj Foujdar shall be subjected to trial for the alleged offence and to commensurate punishment, if the charge be proved against him.

Article 4.—The cession of the low lands along the extent of our frontier so as to make the base of the hills the boundary of our territory, is indispensable. It will be for

Article 4.—The **Rajah** of Nepal hereby cedes to the Honourable Company in perpetuity, the whole of the territory recently in the occupation of the Government of

future consideration, whether to transfer to the Nabod Vizier such part of the Terrae adjoining His Excellency's territory as may belong to the Nepaulese, or to grant it to the restored Chiefs of the neighbouring hill principalities.

Article 5.—The total exclusion of the Goorka influence, power, and authority, from the territories west of the Gogra, is indispensable. This will leave at our disposal Kamaon, and will greatly circumscribe the resources of the Goorkas. The Gogra forms a marked boundary, if the limitation should stop there; but it is probable that Dootee, and other countries east of that river, will have risen against the Goorkas, in time to entitle themselves to the benefit of the succeeding article.

Article 6.—Every obligation of good faith and of policy prompts the insertion of an article to this effect. Some observations on its tenour are contained in the body of the instructions to Major Bradshaw. The officers employed

Nepaul, situated below the first range of hills from the eastern border of Morung to the Ganges, and renounces all claims or pretension of every description on that territory.

Article 5.—The **Rajah** of Nepaul for himself, his heirs and successors, hereby renounces all claims and pretensions whatsoever over the Countries situated to the west of the river Gogra, formerly conquered by the Goorka arms, and engages to withdraw from those countries, within the space of days from this date, any Nepaulese troops which may be still in those countries; and the **Rajah** hereby binds himself, and his heirs and successors, never to renew his claims or pretensions on those countries.

Article 6.—Whereas the British Government has entered into engagements of protection and guarantee against the Goorka power with the Chiefs of several Hill principalities lying to the eastward of the Gogra, and has en-

to negotiate will transmit, either to Major Bradshaw or to the Governor-General, a list of the Chiefs with whom engagements have been made, or who have risen in arms against the Goorkas, up to the date of their receipt of information of the conclusion of peace. Latter, as well as the former, must be included as they will equally incur the resentment of the Goorkas.

couraged the inhabitants to assist in restoring the authority of their ancient chiefs, the **Rajah** of Nepaul hereby recognizes and acknowledges the validity of those engagements, and renounces all claim or pretensions over the territories of such Hill Chiefs as may have entered into engagements to the above effect with the Honourable Company, or may have risen against the Goorka power, upto the period when hostilities shall have ceased. A list of all Chiefs coming within the foregoing description shall be delivered to the **Rajah** of Nepaul, at the earliest practicable period of time. The **Rajah** engages never to molest or wage war against those Chiefs who may receive the benefit of this article, and who are under the guarantee of the Honourable Company, not to interfere in any manner in their disputes, either spontaneously or by invitation; and the **Rajah** further agrees, that all differences arising between the State of Nepaul and any of those Principalities shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government, which will decide according

to justice and right after due examination, and the **Rajah** further engages to abide by its award.

**Article 7.**—This is indispensable and cannot be resisted on any valid grounds.

**Article 7.**—The **Rajah** of Nepal hereby engages never to injure or molest, any person residing within the territory which may remain to him for any part which they may have taken in the present war.

**Article 8.**—This article rests on the supposition that the Government of Nepal has the means of making a large pecuniary payment, a point on which information will probably be procurable in a more advanced stage of our operation. The amount and periods of payment must be regulated by information to be received. Major Bradshaw will, however, consider the retention or exclusion of this determination by his discretion. The hostages must be selected from the **Rajah's** own family, or that of Sheem Sein.

**Article 8.**—Whereas the Honourable Company has been exposed to a great expense, by the preparation with it has been compelled to make for the war now happily concluded, the **Rajah** of Nepal engages to pay to the British Government the sum of ..., according to the following, persons shall be surrendered into the hands of the British Government, as hostages for the liquidation of the above sum, and shall not be liberated until the whole is paid.

**Article 9.**—The Governor-General, has lately received information that Europeans, and even British subjects, have recently been employed in disciplining the Nepaulese troops. If this prove to be the case,

**Article 9.**—The **Rajah** engages not to take or retain in his service the subject of any European or American State, nor any subject of the British Government, European or native of India without

and those persons be still in the service of Nepal, every effort should be made to seize them, and they should be sent down to Fort William as prisoners.

Article 10.—The permanent Residence of a British Minister at the Court of Nepal, if that State shall survive the present war, appears to be the very desirable measure. If a British Minister had been resident there of late years, it is probable that the present war would have avoided. As the object of excluding us from a knowledge of the country, and the passes into it, will no longer be attainable, the residence of a British Minister is not so likely to be viewed with jealousy and alarm as heretofore.

Article 11.—The renewal of the Commercial treaty will perhaps lay the foundation of an improved system of Commercial intercourse with Nepal and the neighbouring countries but this stipulation is not considered to be indispensable, and may be omitted altogether. A stipulation, in general terms, for a free commercial

the Permission of the British Government.

Article 10. —In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the two States, it is agreed that accrediters from each shall reside at the Court of the other.

Article 11.—The treaty of Commerce concluded between the two States in 1792, is hereby declared to be renewed in full force; and the contracting parties engage to concert together, for the purpose of introduction into that treaty such alterations as may appear to be expedient.

intercourse between the two States, would, however, to be a desirable substitute, if the article, as it at present stands, is omitted.

Article 12.—Requires no remark. The blanks in this and preceding articles will be filled up by Major Bradshaw according to his discretion. Any delay in the receipt of the ratification by the **Rajah** beyond the stipulated period, if not satisfactorily accounted for must be followed by a renewal of hostile operations. Major Bradshaw will consider these notes to have the force of regular instruction for his guidance.

Camp. Bareilly  
the 26th Nov. 1814.

Article 12.—The treaty shall be ratified by the **Rajah** of Nepaul within ...days from this date, and the ratification delivered to Major Bradshaw, who engages to procure and deliver to the **Rajah** the ratification of the Governor - General in...days, or sooner if practicable.

Done at.....,on, & c.

## APPENDIX-2

Extract from a letter from Mr. W. A. Brooke to the Principal Private Secretary of the Governor-General.\*

**Baboo** Jeynarain Gosaul brought to me this morning a Nepaul Pundit, named Basdeo, who has resided for some years in this city on the part of Rundoz, son of Ummer Singh Thapa, the son of the Great **Surdar** to the westward. This Basdeo informed me of his having received a letter from Rundoz, desiring him to communicate to me the wishes of himself and father of joining the British troops, and putting them in possession of Nepaul, on condition of his being continued in the possession of lands which he holds from the Nepaul Government, yielding a revenue of thirty thousand rupees per annum, and a monthly allowance of two thousand rupees, after the English are in possession of Nepaul. and that the **Rajah** be continued in the Government.

It seems from Basdeo's account that there are two interests in Nepaul; one **Beem Sing's**, the other **Rundoz's**. **Beem Sing** has the command of the army; and **Rundoz**, as **Dewan**, has the management of the country. **Beem Sing** has great power at present, from the troops being under his command; but seems to be aware that they will not be able to make a stand against our troops, and in order to alarm **Rajah**, so as to induce him to make overtures to the **Bootan** Government to join him against us, has endeavoured to impress the **Rajah** with the idea, that the

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\*PRN, pp 344—345.

moment the English get possession of Nepaul they will dethrone him, and put some other branch of the family in his place. Rundoz, on the other hand, does not wish Beem Sing to acquire such an accession of strength, and is desirous, as well as the **Rajah**, to submit to our Government, on the condition above stated.

The Nepaulese are in the greatest consternation. Beem Sing wants Rundoz to go with troops against the English; but this has been declined by Rundoz for the present. If his overtures are accepted, he will then offer to take the command, and deliver himself and troops to us. Basdeo says, that on this being effected, Ummer Sing Thapa will follow his son's example. Should Beem Sing determine on going in command of the Nepaulese against our troops, Rundoz will be left with the **Rajah** at Catmandoo, and will have it in his power to give every assistance to our entrance into the country, by a different road from the one which Beem Sing may take, and which would lead our army to Catmandoo in fifteen days.

The road recommended by Basdeo as the best, and totally unprotected, is from Ramnuggur to Chittore, eighteen coss of plain country, from Chittore to Mutties Kota two and a half coss from thence to Thankot Bhunjun eleven coss and from thence to Catmandoo a distance of only four coss. Ramnuggur is said to be eighteen **cutcha** coss to the westward of Betteeah, sixty coss from Bootwull and twenty five coss from Burhurwah, where Major Bradshaw is encamped. Basdeo says, that the road from Ramnuggur is passable for elephants, camels, and bullocks, but not calculated for hackeries; that there is not a fort in the road, and that plenty of water is to be had at every stage. He also informs me, that the Nepaulese expect the English to take the Bootwull and Muckwanpoor roads and intend to direct their force accordingly; in which case, if our troops march by the Ramnuggur road, it will be almost impossible for them to offer any essential obstacle to our troops.

Ummer Singh Thappa has three sons, Rundoz, Runjore, and Runkur. Runjore is with his father, Rundoz and Runkur in Catmandoo. Basdeo says, that the moment Rundoz hears from him that proposals are approved of, he will adopt proper measures for putting us in possession of Nepaul, and that the British Government may depend on his father Ummer Singh doing the same.

Ummer Singh Thappa, and his son Rundoz, have a difficult game to play; for Beem Singh threatens the latter, that if his father does not beat the English, his head shall answer for it. Of course, it cannot be expected that Ummer Singh should join us before he is satisfied of the safety of his sons, Rundoz and Runkur.

I told Basdeo, that not having received any letter, either from the **Rajah** or from Rundoz, I could not enter into the business; on which he said, that he would shortly present me with letters from both, Basdeo and family reside in the city. I think there is not any reason to suspect him of fabricating all the particulars he has stated to me.

I have deemed it my duty to state the above, which if you should think proper to make known to his Lordship, he will judge of the expediency of directing me to decline attending to any further representations from Basdeo, or of encouraging any proposals he may have to make. I shall write to Bradshaw, to make known to him the road pointed out by Basdeo, and another by the banks of the Baugmutty. The latter leaves Muckwanpore fort and Cheesa Gurh, or Cheesa Panee, about sixteen coss on the left.

## APPENDIX-3

Translations of Enclosures in a Despatch from Major Bradshaw to the Secret Department, dated the 29th December 1814. (Received on the 11th January 1815.)\*

No. 1.— Copy of a Letter from the **Rajah** of Nepaul to Chunder Sekher Opadeea, dated the 15th **Aghun** 1871 **Sumbut**, (11th December 1814) in reply to Chunder Sekher Opadeea's **Arzee**.

It is necessary that a negotiation should establish the ancient relations between this State and the English, and conduct the negotiation in conformity thereto, so as to afford satisfaction of the English. A slight difference arose respecting the boundaries; but amity had always subsisted between ancestors and the English. Major Bradshaw came with powers to settle the boundary disputes. This was good. The Major is respectable amongst the English for wisdom and discretion, and is of a mature age; he is well acquainted with the nature of the amicable relations which have subsisted between the Gorkha and British Government, and understands the language and customs of Hindoostan. May the two states by some means be cordially united. Foolishmen have raised a quarrel on slight grounds, in order to disturb the friendship which subsisted between them: may it be amicably adjusted. I felt satisfied, from Major Bradshaw's wisdom and discretion, that he would effect an adjustment. I did

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\*PRN, pp. 376-377

not conceive that, out of so trifling a cause such a war would arise, sowing the seeds of injury to both States: but God has willed that it should happen so. Still, however if you are of opinion that Major Bradshaw, considering the long friendship which has subsisted between the two States, is willing to attribute the quarrel which has now arisen to those who were its real authors, and is disposed to promote the establishment of peace, the path of negotiation is yet open. I have no wish but for peace. No advantage can arrive to either party from the continuance of these differences. Ascertain and inform me distinctly whether the Major is inclined to peace or war. If he is disposed to treat on equitable terms, and wishes to put an end to the differences between the two states, do you remain there to be near at hand: negotiations can also be carried on by letter. If it should be necessary to send General Beem Sing Thappa to some place in the hills it can be done. When I know how matters are situated I will give orders.

I desire you will write again, and in more distinct terms, respecting the points which are noticed in your arzee. If the business depends upon General Beem Sing's going, say so distinctly: no obstacle will arise on that account. Therefore ascertain correctly the actual state of affairs, and write me information of the same.

## APPENDIX-4

Political Letter to Bengal, Dated  
13th October 1815.\*

1. Our last letter to you in this department was dated the 13th September 1815.

2. In the thirty-eight paragraph in the Political Department of the 16th January 1815, with reference to your several letters and proceedings at that time before us, upon the subject of the Nepaulese encroachments, we took occasion to observe, that as the result of the local inquiries which had been instituted on the part of the British and Nepaulese Government had satisfied you in regard to the Company's right to the **Zemindary** of Bootwul and the **talook** of Sheoraj Bunder, we expressed a confident hope that the Government of Nepal would yield to your application for the surrender of those lands, without being you under the necessity of having resource to more decided measures.

3. We deem it unnecessary to notice in minute detail, the voluminous reports and documents to which, in your several despatches of a more recent date, you have referred, relative to the discussions which have taken place with the Nepal Government on the subject of lands in dispute, both in Bootwal and Sheoraj, as well as on the frontier of the district of Sarun.

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\*PRN, pp. 547-550.

4. As far as we are enable to judge from a perusal of these documents, the Company's right to the lands which were usurped by the Nepaulese appears to have been fully established; and with reference to the cause stated in your Declaration of the 1st November 1814, as having led to the war, it must be admitted that they afford proofs, not only of aggravated aggression on the part of Nepaulese, but even of acts of direct hostility.

5. The necessity of having recourse to arms for the maintenance of our rights upon the frontier of Nepaul, if representation and remonstrance should fail, has already been recognized by us, in our despatch of the 18th February 1814.

6. In any question, however, concerning Nepaul, it must be borne in mind, that though weak for offence, and quite unable as we trust materially to injure us, it is for defence extremely strong, very capable of resisting an invasion, and if to be subdued at all, certainly not likely to yield, without requiring from us a large expenditure of military and pecuniary means. At any rate, the only objects, which, in our situation of pre-eminent power, maintained by most expensive establishments, could render a war proper with the poor and mountainous country of Nepaul, were the preservation of our honour and of the integrity of our territories, which objects, we conceive, might have been secured by the employment of one strong concentrated body of troops, and we therefore regret, that you should have deemed it necessary to pursue a course of hostilities upon an extended plan, in a country so difficult of access, from situation and climate, as Nepaul.

7. In view, likewise, to the state of our finances, and of our relation with other powers more near to us, it was certainly most undesirable, if it would have possibly been avoided, to adopt such a plan of operations; and we contemplate with the greatest disquietude the

new levies of troops to which you have had recourse. These are upon so considerable a scale, that with the other expenses of the war, they must impose a most oppressive burden upon our finances, which it has been our anxious solicitude for a series of years past, to place upon such a footing as would lead to the progressive diminution of the Indian debt; and those levies, moreover, were made at the very time, when from a strong conviction of the necessity of retrenchment in our expenditure we have been employed at home in reducing the military establishments even below their former standard.

8. We observe by the statement transmitted as an enclosure in Mr. Tucker's letter to Mr. Secretary Cobb, dated the 25th January 1815, that the expense of the new levies amount to Sicca Rupees 7,84,369 per month; but as we have collected from your several advices, that the additional forces to be raised exceed twenty thousand men, the expense will certainly be larger than the sum above stated.

9. Another consequence, also, will be produced, which though it falls not strictly within the department in which we now write, it is important, and so much connected with the present subject, that we cannot avoid adverting to it here.

10. We find with extreme concern, that the effects of the Nepaulese war, are so strongly felt in your Financial Department, as to induce the apprehension that the advances to be issued for our European investment in 1815-16 will be reduced to a very small sum indeed.

11. It is true, that your late financial advices (18th February 1815) do not expressly state that there will be no advances for the year 1815-1816; but, from the tenour of those advices, added to the communication made to you by the Governor-in-Council of Fort St. George, dated

the 3rd February 1815, which by your Secretary's letter appears to have been received at Catcutta on the 20th February 1815, we are impressed with the opinion, that from the urgent demand for cash to carry on the extensive military operations in which you had engaged, we cannot estimate on any considerable sum being advanced for an European investment in the current year of 1815-16.

12. If the advances for investments are to be withheld, the sales at this House for Indian goods will soon be brought to a stand; in which case, not only will the operations of our home finances be impeded, but it will also involve the impossibility of our being able to afford to India the assistance, in the event of the continuance of warfare, which would be so necessary, and which we should be so desirous to furnish.

13. With respect to the operations of the war which have hitherto come to our knowledge, we were deeply concerned to hear to the repeated failure of our troops in their attacks upon the fort of Kalunga, in the first of which we have to regret the loss of that gallant officer Sir Robert Rollo Gillespie, as well as the lives of several other brave officers and men, who fell a sacrifice, we fear, to a desperate attempt upon that fort, without the adequate means of ensuring success,

14. As previously to the second assault upon the fort of Kalunga the reduction of that fortress was considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as no less necessary to the honour of the British arms than to the security of the British interests, we are not surprised that his Lordship should have judged it expedient to institute an inquiry into the causes which led to the second failure upon that fortress, and we conclude that he will extend his enquiries as to the causes which have produced such lamentable results. Among others, the want of proper

equipment in the different departments, and a want of celerity in their movements, seem from Major-Generals Wood, Martindell, and Marley's letters to the Adjutant-General, dated the 13th, 20th, and 27th December 1814, and the 25th January 1815, to be too apparent.

15. But while we lament the successful resistance which the enemy has hitherto opposed to the several Divisions of the Army under Major-Generals Wood, Marley, and Martindell, we had great satisfaction in receiving the information contained in your despatch of the 27th December 1814, of the success of the detachment under the Command of Major Bradshaw of the enemy's post of Burhuwa, intimating also, that the immediate result of that affair had been the complete possession of the Terraie of Chumparun (Sarun), and the subjection of its inhabitants to the authority of the British Governments; and we have been much gratified with the account of the operation of the Division under the command of Colonel (now Major-General) Sir David Ochterlony, stating the evacuation by the enemy of all the stockades, except two, immediately under the fort of Ramgurh, as preparatory to his advance to the siege of that fortress.

16. We are fully sensible of the disadvantage of having a frontier, so extensive as that of our present possessions, in immediate contact, from the eastern to the western extremity, with a single power such as Nepaul, and should be well pleased to see it divided among a number of less powerful chiefs, who might for a time retain a sense of obligation to the British Government; but we cannot consider this contingent benefit as sufficient to counterbalance the actual disadvantages of a protracted war.

17. We concur in opinion with the Governor-General, that the most advisable disposition of the lands acquired from the Goorkas would be the

restoration of them to the **Rajah**, with the exception only of those lands which may be desirable for the purpose of rendering our boundary line more definite, or our frontier more defensible.

18. These are the general views with which we have considered the project of a Treaty with Nepaul, which forms an enclosure to your letter of the 27th December; but as conditions upon which it may be concluded much necessary depend upon the actual state of the parties at the period of the negotiation, we shall not here enter into any more particular observations upon that subject.

19. Having now put you in possession, as far as the state of our information would admit, of our sentiments in regard to the war with Nepaul, we trust that you will, in all your proceedings, dip those sentiments, in view; and that you will not enter into permanent engagements, nor adopt any important measures, the nature of which does not require a prompt decision, without that reference to us, which is required by the enactments of the Legislature, and which is indispensably necessary to the maintenance of that uniformity of system, so essential to the welfare and prosperity of the British Empire in India.

20. But we are inclined to the opinion, from the nature of the resistance opposed by the enemy, that if, instead of dividing our force into so many detachments for the purpose of offensive operations, a concentrated attack had been made, it might possibly have been the means of bringing the war to a successful conclusion, without looking to the issue of another campaign. But we should have had less hesitation in forming a judgement upon this point, had the report alluded to in the fourth paragraph of the Adjutant-General's letter of the 9th

October 1814, as having been made in the Secret and Political Departments, respecting the military objects which the Commander-in-Chief proposed to accomplish by means of the different Divisions above mentioned, been entered upon the proceedings or enclosed as a number in the packet.

We are, & C.

( Signed )

London,  
13th October 1815.

C H A R L E S   G R A N T,

T H O M A S   R E I D,  
& C. & C.

## APPENDIX-5

Secret Letter from Lord Moira,  
Dated 20th July 1815.

To the Honourable and Secret  
Committee.\*

Honourable Sirs;

1. A precise view of the State into which our recently troubled circumstances have subsided, must obviously be so interesting to you, that I had eagerly contemplated the giving you of that satisfaction.

2. The delay, however, of peace with the Goorkas has retarded my undertaking such an exposition of facts and probabilities.

3. A tolerable ascertainment of the value of the cessions expected from the enemy, is very necessary towards enabling you to understand the degree of advantages attained by the war. As the matter now stands, some uncertainty must attend the representation I have to make to you. Still the leading features are not likely to alter, therefore I ought not to forbear communication particulars, as far as they may be defined with confidence.

4. The procrastination of the Goorkas in concluding a treaty is not to be wondered at. The subscribing to the loss of half their Empire is a painful submission for a proud people: so that the prospects of

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\*PRN, pp. 673-674.

another campaign is now pretended to me, by their holding off, during a season in which they know we cannot act against them. Without any distinct hope, they naturally cling to the possibility that accident may produce a mitigation of terms, imagining it will always be time enough to submit before November. I have endeavoured to correct this notion, by causing it to be signified to the negotiators, that if I be constrained to prepare for another campaign I shall invite the defection of the greater part of their subjects, by pledging myself to the re-establishment of the expelled Rajahs: a measure which, supposing us successful, would leave open no future conditions of pacifications, but the confining the Goorkas to their own petty original district, were they to be left as a substantive State at all. They will scarcely risk so formidable an issue, for a desperate chance of recovering by force any part of what we have wrested from them.

5. I thence calculate on a peace, which leaves at your disposal the whole of the hill country, from the Suttleje to the Sardah or Gogra, as well as nearly the entire tract herefore possessed by the Goorkas in the plain.

6. The results to your convenience would be thus considered by me.

1st. The power of a neighbour, equally dangerous to you from position, character, and views, has been irretrievably broken.

2nd. The restoration of the families of the Hill chiefs, on terms of feudal allegiance to the Honourable Company, between the Suttleje and the Ganges, will display your moderation; at the same time that an important barrier is established against Runjeet Sing's ever getting on the flank of your possessions between the Suttleje and Jumna.

3rd. By our holding the province of Kamaon, to which the portion of Gurhwal east of the

Ganges must be annexed, we curb any propensity in the Goorkas to future rupture; for it will be apparent from the map, that all the Goorkas fortresses which commanded the passes from the plains are there by turned. Such, indeed, was the concession of their own officers. We were bound by engagement to retain this province, the aid of its inhabitants having been plighted to us on the express condition that they should be kept under the Government of the Company: We consequently have to fear, that the treachery of our new subjects might counteract the advantage specified.

4th. The province of Kamaon is intrinsically a valuable possession, from its revenue, its mines, and its timber. The command which it is almost certain to give of the exclusive shawl-wool trade may be regarded with much satisfaction. The ready communication which it furnishes with Tartary, offers a market for British manufactures to an undefinable extent; and the facilities which it would give, if necessary, for correspondence with the court of Peking, is deemed by the committee at Canton as the happiest check on the dispositions of the Viceroy of Canton.

5th. The opinion of your power is importantly exalted among the Native Chiefs of Hindustan, by the success, to which their extravagant notions of the Goorka State, attaches redoubled brilliancy. There will, of course, be the less inclination in them to venture a contest with you.

6th. The general sentiment of your own army has received a beneficial spur, which from circumstances it required; and an experience in a warfare, before novel to them, has been attained by a considerable portion of your troops, which would be found of infinite advantage, were operations to become necessary against the Pindarries or other powers in the hill country beyond our Southern frontier.

7th. An example of economy in the management of active service has been put on record, which will prescribe a line of no ordinary moment to the Honourable Company for the future expenditure in the field.

8th. In the opposite scale to these advantages must be weighed; first, the expenses of the war, the interest of which is an addition to your annual outgoing; secondly, an augmentation to the army, great part of which is likely to be a permanent charge, until the condition of the military powers of Hindustan shall be materially altered.

9th. That the war was unavoidable, and it burdens, of course, one of those contingencies inseparable from the tenure of your Empire, is not a consideration to be urged, where the fact of the absolute loss or gain is alone discussed. On that principle, nothing can be said at the present beyond this: the expense of the war (provided for by a loan on easy terms) has been far short of what a measurement of its nature had caused to be anticipated; and the liquidation of the funds borrowed may probably be arranged much to the convenience of the Honourable Company. In the meantime, those funds have also answered pressing concerns of the Honourable Company, altogether unconnected with military demands.

10th. The augmentation of the army, although adopted to meet sudden exigency, have been before my arrival in India recommended, as a measure imperiously called by the general policy, as well appear from the reports of the two late Commander-in-Chief, and from my despatch to the Honourable the Vice-President-in-Council, dated the 9th February last. The tranquility of your possessions, the security of your collections, perhaps the preservation of your territory, were represented as urgently requiring a material increase to your establishment; an opinion to which my deliberate judgement fully subscribes.

11th. It is true, a large addition of expense is entailed. I should consider this objection to be balanced by the greatest certainty of receipts into your treasury; but still that would be a matter of speculation. A more positive set-off may be stated, in the income of the territory which will have been acquired by the war, by the settled contributions from the Hill Chiefs, and by improvements in the revenue of these Western provinces, which could never exist without a protection more efficient than your former establishment afforded. Adverting to these resources, I flatter myself than at least no diminution will be experienced in the surplus on which I have encouraged you to reckon.

12th. From this recapitulation, I trust, grounds will appear to justify the profession of my satisfaction at present position of your affairs. The comfort I have in congratulating you on that point cannot, I apprehend, be adequately appreciated by you, to whom it has not been practicable to impart a just notion of the heavy impending embarrassment which fortune dissipated.

Futtygurh,  
20th, July 1815.

I have, & C.  
(Signed) MOIRA.

## APPENDIX—6

Letter to the **Rajah** of Nepal,  
written on the 13th January 1816.\*

It was my hope and expectation to have been able to address you in the language of friendship and congratulation, on the renewal of the former relations of amity between the British Government and the state of Nepal have been deceived and frustrated, by the extraordinary conduct adopted by your Government, in refusing to ratify a solemn treaty concluded by your authorized agents, stated by yourself and your ministers to have been vested with full powers. In the execution of those powers they cannot have erred since they had almost at the moment of signing the treaty returned from your presence when they must have received your deliberated and precise instructions to accede to the proffered terms of peace, the communication of which to your Government was the professed object of their journey to Catmandoo.

This aggravated and unexampled act of treachery has excited my astonishment. It has removed, at once, all doubt regarding the purport of those delusive negotiations, with which you have endeavoured to practise on the generosity and unsuspecting good faith of the British Government, for some months past: it has shown to the British Government in their true colours, the character and spirit of your policy, and has destroyed

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\*PRN, pp. 894-895.

that confidence in mutual good faith, which is the only secure and honourable tie between independent States.

You have disregarded the frequent and solemn warnings which my former letters have conveyed to you, and have exposed yourself, your family, and your country, to all those fatal consequences, which must result from that neglect, if it be not immediately repaired. There is yet time to avoid the danger. The instant ratification of the treaty and its transmission to Major-General Sir David Ochterlony and the immediate execution of all stipulations depending on your Government, will avert the impending evil, and will even induce me to consider the propriety of relaxing from the rigour of some parts of that engagement. But any delay will be fatal, and will inevitably involve you in all the consequences I have already predicated as the result of the conduct you have pursued. Of those consequences you will yourself be the author; and your fate will be aggravated by the consciousness that it has been produced not by unmerited and unavoidable calamity, but an act of deliberate perfidy, unexampled in the history of civilized States. You have already experienced, that although I do not use menaces, the resolution which I do intimate if followed up with unalterable determination and I now apprise you, that if you preserve in your breach of faith, the war cannot stop short, till it shall have utterly extinguished the Goorka power.

This letter will be forwarded to you by Major-General Sir David Ochterlony, who is vested with the command of the British force advancing into your territory, and with the conduct of all political affairs connected with your Government.

## APPENDIX--7

Letter from Lord Moira to the  
Chairman, Dated the 6th August 1816.\*

To Thomas Ried. Esq., &c, &c, &c.  
My dear Sir;

The conception which the Honourable Court have been pleased to intimate, in their letter of the October 13th, 1815 that the first campaign of the Nepaul War was injudiciously planned, appears to me to demand distinct notice, as it involves a very serious charge against my conduct of your affairs in a crisis of great importance.

The unskilful management of your concerns would be no venial error. It would have been culpable in me to have accepted so weighty a trust, without a reasonable confidence that study and experience had qualified me to discharge it fitly. The imputation upon me is, therefore, grave. I must, of course, be anxious to satisfy you that it has been adopted without sufficient scrutiny.

The connected view of the motives, the plan, and the subsequent conduct of the Nepaul war, which was submitted to the Honourable Committee in my despatch of the 2nd August 1815, may perhaps already have had this effect; but at all events, it cannot be superfluous, that I should lay before you some observations in reply to a variety of charges and insinuations which have been made at home against the cause and conduct of the war.

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\*PRN, pp. 992-998.

The clearest mode in which I can submit an exposition to you will be the replying seperately to the several charges which I have noticed as having been advanced in England.

1st. The war was forwardly undertaken without necessary:--

The necessity of the war has been recognized by the Honourable Court from a knowledge of all that led to it. Still there are particulars which it may be well to detail, not only as furnishing a more distinct explanation for any quarter to which you might wish to communicate it, but as exhibiting to yourself a more satisfactory illustration of the special measures adopted. The aggressions of the Goorkas had been the subject of complaint for many years. A sense of the difficulty how to deal with a people possessing such peculiar advantage of position, rendered Government naturally shy of coming to a rupture: when the hope of settling by amicable adjustment a point at issue with the State of Nepaul could not be indulged, the trespass was overlooked, to avoid the necessity of chastening it by force. The rapacious spirit of the Goorkas was, of course, encouraged by success and impunity; our forbearance being ascribed to our fear. We smarted at once from the consciousness of unmanly submission and from disappointment in our temporizing policy. The encroachments of the Goorkas became incessant, extended their scale, and were evidently pursued on a systematic plan. We were shamed, at length, into serious expostulation; yet this remonstrance could not obtain for us a temporary respite from the injuries of which we complained. While discussions were going on with a view to the investigation of lands recently occupied under loose pretensions by the Goorkas, they insultingly expelled our police and revenue officers from a tract containing twenty-two villages, which had uniformly paid rent to us for a course of years. Even under this indignity, our Government remained temperate. Indis-

putable as was our right to the lands in question, we only laid hold of a proposition which had been thrown out by the **Rajah** of Nepual, with no expectation that we should bind him to it, for the appointment of commissioners by both Governments to determine by local examination the disputed points. Though this referred to another object in debate, it was so applicable to the one under immediate notice, that the **Rajah** could not avoid compliance. As it was understood that the proceeding should be final, our Government intimated that in the event of the Goorka commissioners not making good their title to the twenty-two villages, the tract would be immediately resumed by us. The commissioners met and proceeded to the examination of the claims of the respective Governments to Bcotwal and Sheoraj. Ours produced **Sunnuds** and rent-rolls that were altogether incontestable. The Goorka commissioners, not attempting to exhibit any proofs, let it be seen that they had only been gaining time, under a shew of discussion: for at length they said roundly, that "altogether, although they did not pretend to invalidate our documents, they were not empowered to give up the lands." In this state I found things. I had certainly an option: I might shrink from the declaration plighted by Lord Minto, abandoning the property of the Company, sacrificing the safety of our subjects and staining the character of our Government: or I had to act up to the engagement bequeathed to me, and to reprove the tresspass of an insatiable neighbour. That I should have chosen the latter alternative will hardly afford ground of censure: still every care was used to avoid giving provocation, and the resumption was proceeded upon as if it have been the consequence of mutual agreement. The Goorka establishments were removed from the litigated villages, without roughness and without contest of any sort: our civil officers were replaced in function. There was so little appearance of hostility in the measure or of exasperation of the part of the Goorkas, that it was not thought necessary to keep any of our troops in the district during the unhealthy season. For a

certain period of the year there reigns in the vicinity of the forest, throughout its whole length, a fever which has always proved dreadfully fatal to our **Sepoys**, though it slightly affects the people born in the tract. On the removal of our soldiers from apprehension of this malady, a regular force of **Goorkas**, commanded by **Munraj Foujdar**, a public functionary of high rank, surprised our police and revenue stations, murdering most of the defenceless individuals. The chief **Thannander** escaped the massacre, but was made prisoner. **Munraj Foujdar** deliberately caused him to be tied to a tree, and to be shot to death with arrows, as an example to deter others from taking office under us against the will of the **Goorkas**. The **Rajah** of **Nepaul** was informed, by a letter from me in council, that we must consider war as actually made upon us, unless this atrocious outrage were disavowed, and its perpetrator punished. The answer was haughty, evasive and even menacing. Need I ask what procedure was incumbent on your Government ?

2nd. Without incurring the expense of invading the enemy's territory we might easily have occupied and held the disputed lands.....

Were it not that I have seen this opinion communicated from England, I should think it superfluous to observe, that this is the very course we did adopt till the lesson received in consequence pointed out the necessity of a very different system. The measures recommended could never have been tried by us, but on the expectation that **Goorka** Government would acquiesce in it, rather than maintain their injustice by a war. The moment they shewed their determination to stand a contest with us, he must have been short-sighted indeed, who did not see that there was no other policy left for us, but to break down effectually that hostile power by crushing it in its home. No man could be weak enough to imagine that so acute an enemy would restrict his efforts to the tract which was the subject of contention: therefore, on the

defensive principle, we should have had to spread our troops along the frontier of six hundred miles, in an uniform plain, without a river, a fortress, or a position, to cover any portion of that extent. If we did not thus spread our troops, the ungarnished spots would be ravaged by small parties: if we did so spread them the line must be every where so weak, as that the Goorkas, descending from any given point within the hills where they had concentrated a force, must overpower what so ever unsupported detachment they might please to attack. Our information respecting their movements would be always precarious, for the ferocity with which they put persons to death on the slightest suspicion, made it extraordinarily difficult to get spies to venture into that country: whereas our habits offered no intimidation to these from whom the Goorkas would learn every particular respecting our stations. Such a campaign must have been disheartening, and expensive, without having brought us a step nearer to a decision of the contest: we had, therefore, to succumb under indignity and injury, or to undertake offensive operations. The mention, at the beginning of this paragraph, of our having tried to reoccupy lands the usurped and yet avoid hostilities, leads to a particular of some interest for me. It is scarcely credible that Sir George Nugent, who had in his official station expressed, not simply concurrence, but strong feeling, as to the necessity of war should ever subsequently have held language which might lead others to regard that war as having been evitable. What I have heard from European, however, makes, it questionable, whether he may not have spoken on the subject in a manner exciting more doubt than he probably meant to convey. Earnestly hoping that my information is incorrect, I still wish to satisfy you, my dear Sir, under what sensation the resolution of war was adopted. The council was sitting on ordinary business, when the dispatch announcing the slaughter of our police and revenue officers was received by the Secretary for the Political Department. He immediately brought it to the Council, and

read it to Board. It was instantly said (not by me), "Oh ! the Goorkas have made war upon us: no discussion is left in the case." The Sentiment was so acknowledged by the rest of us, that no discussion did take place. We merely lamented to each other the vexatious exigency which had befallen us, seeing no alternative but to meet hostility as best we might. I stated to my colleauges, generally, my notions of the operations which I thought it would be advisable to undertake, and of the resources on which I could calculate. I then added, that as no military movements could take place for four or five months (the sickly season being at hand), I was sure they would approve my making still a trial to avert war, since that trial should be so fashioned as not to commit the dignity of British Government. I confessed that the private information which we had of the disposition of the Goorka Chiefs left little room to hope their insolent confidence would stoop to any terms of reparation. The trial was made: the result has been mentioned. The following passage from the letter of the Vice-President in council (Mr. Edmonstone), of the 4th October 1815 declares the unanimity of the council, as to the inevitability of the war, in the hour of the decision: and I am confident that no one of the gentlemen who signed that letter ever hinted a different opinion. "Even had those observations admitted the interpretation, that any existing or anticipated difficulties in the Financial Department arose from the war with Nepaul, still we venture to express the belief, that the inferences stated by your Lordship could not be justly drawn from them. We shall not enter into any detail of argument in support of this opinion: the first inference would, of course, be repelled, by the tenour of the despatches to the Authorites at home, in which the Members of Government have unanimously maintained the necessity of the war."

3rd. The management of the war was not judiciously conceived, nor were the impressions on the enemy's territory duly supported:.....

I am almost tempted to suspect, that someone has contrived to mislead the Honourable Court, by directing their attention to the recognized advantage of army's acting in a compact body, while he concealed from them that there might be cases to which the general principle would be wholly inapplicable. The only criterion of determining whether the plan of campaign should be or not, is the justness of its adaptation to the country in which it is to be carried on, and to object ultimately contemplated. General rules are inept and mischievous, if they be incorrectly applied. To effect such a decisive deminution of the enemy's immediate strength and future resources, as should disable him from ever repeating his insolent aggressions, was the object in the invasion of Nepal; and to achieve this in the speediest manner, was a policy dictated by other important considerations, as well as by the desire of saving expense. This being the principle, the nature of the enemy's country, and the state of his defences, were to regulate by which our purpose was to be fulfilled. In a country which is a continued succession of mountains, drawn out to great extent along your possessions, with all its rivers running perpendicularly to your frontier, there is no making different corps prosecute a combined movement to a common point. The unexampled difficulty of feeding troops in that country, supplies not being transportable in any other manner than on the shoulders of men, rendered it impracticable to act in any large bodies. But supposing it had been possible to push a corps, irresistible from its numbers, to the capital no sudden termination of the war would have been produced by the success of such a measure singly. It is certain the enemy had so lively an interest of pride in the preservation of Catmandoo, as that they would make the utmost exertions to protect it: an attempt, therefore on that city, was a sure mode of keeping a large body of the Goorkas army withdrawn from that quarter where you hoped your impression might have a permanent effect. But much loss of property, public and private, would

likewise be involved in the fate of Catmandoo, so that its capture would have been a real wound. It was thence expedient to connect an effort against the capital with other operations. Had that attempt stood alone, it would have been an erroneous move. Suppose Catmandoo taken, the Goorka Chiefs would soon have perceived that our possession of the city did not materially cripple the State, and their sagacity would then discover that which was incumbent on our forethought to have calculated. Having occupied Catmandoo (stating it as a single operation) we could not remain there; and no other definite enterprize would present itself to be undertaken. Whatsoever provisions the enemy might not have been able to destroy before he abandoned the city must soon have been consumed. The impossibility of covering, by any chain of posts, the progress of convoys from our frontier through an unbroken series of woody hills, must be comprehended by every one: but, did not this exist, the season was to come when the pestilential malady of the forest cuts off all intercourse whatever between hilly country and the plain. The army must have retired, to avoid being shut up in total preclusion from correspondence with our territory. The retreat would have had the appearance of failure, if not of flight. Your columns would have been harassed by a pursuing enemy, with the semblance of shrinking from the contest. You would have regained your own frontier with a discredit that outbalanced all the boasts of having taken the enemy's capital, and the war would have stood no nearer to an issue than it did at the beginning of the campaign. The only solid policy was to fix on a river, the banks of which were of a strength to be guarded by a moderate force against any efforts of the enemy, and to make that river a line of separation from the snowy ridge to the plain, by which you should cut off from the enemy's empire all that lay west of such a boundary. The Kali, which serves the Goorka possession nearly in two, as to extent, of surface was the feature required. Before it could be secured as a barrier, it was necessary that all the Goorka force west of it (which happened to be

the best of their troops) should be reduced. Kamaon had, at this time, its full proportion of troops for its defence: a proportion subsequently diminished by successive detachments sent to Ummer Sing Thappa, when he had lulled their suspicions of our having any designs against the province; and it would have been immediately reinforced, had a division been assembled in any situation that seemed to point at it. I hence determined, that the first attempt should be on the enemy's forces west the Ganges, allotting for the attack of Kamaon, when it should become comparatively weakened, some battalions in retired quarters. The services of those battalions were unexpectedly required to sustain Major General Martindell, in consequence of embarrassments which he had experienced, and I was thereby constrained to make the invasion of Kamaon more tardy than I had intended. Meanwhile I kept up a secret correspondence with Kamaoners, securing their assisting for the moment in which we should be able to act. To prevent interference from the eastward, Major-General John Sullivan Wood, from Goruckpore, was ordered to penetrate the hills, and to fulfil certain objects of no import but as they were to distract the enemy or diminish his means of prolonging resistance. A separate (the principle) division was assembled under Major-General Marley, for the purpose of pushing at the capital and destroying the enemy's resources, as events might present the facility. Each of these officers, restrained, by extravagant notions of the Goorka force which that dexterous people circulated by their emissaries in the neighbourhood of our camps, continued inactive, after having received affronts from the enemy. Still they kept in play the main strength of the Goorka army till our purpose was effected to the westward. The campaign terminated by our being posted behind the Kali, without a possibility of dislodgement, after we had wrested from the Goorkas the whole intermediate country between that river and the Suteje, a distance of about three hundred miles. It was visible that after such a success, not only the war was essentially finished

but the Goorkas power could never again be formidable. It would be difficult to devise another plan of campaign capable of producing such results. It may not be amiss here to note, as the Honourable Court's observation seems to impute a deficiency of strength to the columns, that each division (originally and before it was reinforced) contained about double the number of troops thought requisite by those from whom I drew my information respecting the several points.

4th. The advantages acquired in the field were not duly insisted on in the conditions of peace:—

When the treaty which I had exacted from the Goorkas was read formally, it was remarked that, instead of the enumeration of cessions, the shorter process might have been adopted, of declaring what was left to the **Rajah** of Nepaul. The principle of negotiation, on my part, was that our future tranquility made it necessary to debilitate the Goorka State, as far as might be done without entirely throwing the old Government. We should have had infinite trouble in the formation and maintainance of any other government and we might also have dissatisfied the Chinese, by settling up a dependent of our own. But the old Government could not exist without a certain extent of resources. These considerations dictated the instructions to Sir David Ochterlony, at the outset of the second campaign, that success was not to occasion any demand additional to the terms of the original treaty.

5th. The invasion of Nepaul was calculated to injure the Honourable Company's interest at Canton.....

The Committee at Canton were of so different an opinion, that they regarded our having secured a communication with Tartary, though Kamaon, as an important protection for the tea trade; because the Viceroy of Canton comprehending the facility with which we

could transmit representations of Peking overland, would fear to indulge himself again in those vexatious practices with which he had lately harassed the supracargoes. In fact, we have opened a correspondence with the Chinese authorities on the frontier, which promises to perpetuate a good understanding.

6th. The operations of the war were carried on with wasteful expenditure.——

Taking a rate from equal numbers of men employed in the field, the positive expenditure has been less than one-third of that of any former war in India for a corresponding length of time were the peculiar extra expenses to which the war in the Goorka territory was subjected (and which would not be incidental to any other) to be deducted from the account, the contrast would be still stronger. It stands proved in figures, that the military operations of this war were conducted with an economy altogether unprecedented. I allude to those within this presidency, for I could not exercise the same minute control over the expenses of the Coast army, though I enjoyed a rigid attention. But it may be said that economy was not observed in the scale of the provision made by me against apprehended attack on the southern and western frontier. To this I answer, that the precautions were to be regulated by the means. Had the case been that the magnitude of preparation would be an embarrassment to the Honourable Company's finances, it would have been incumbent on me to have compounded for risk, and to have done the best I could with confessedly insufficient force; but when I had in hand the funds for establishing through security without recurring to the ordinary revenue, I conceive it would have been impolitic in the extreme, may unpardonable in me to have left anything to chance were the expenditure admitted to be large (which it is not), even in that case it was a saving if it prevented war. I may justly request it to be observed, that in the vast line of frontier, from Cuttack to the Chumbul. there

was not a point so neglected as to have invited a predatory incursion, while the main body of our forces was acting in Nepaul.

7th. The revenues of the Honourable Company were injured by the war.———

On the contrary, there has been a progressive increase in, I believe, every branch, from the commencement of the war to the present time, and there is every reason to expect that this gradual improvement will continue.

8th. The pecuniary credit of the Company was unfavourably effected:—

Before the rupture with the Goorkas took place, the Company's six per cent bonds were at sixteen per cent discount in Calcutta. The discount was gradually diminished to four per cent.

9th. But a heavy debt has been incurred.———

I borrowed from the Nabob Vizier two crores and eight lacks of rupees at six per cent. One crore has been liquidated by the cession of conquered lands, with the trifling addition of Khyregurh. It was thought expedient to apply fifty-four lacks stand in paying off the eight per cent old loan, the remaining fifty-four lacks stand as an added burthen, but had it been desirable to get rid of that burthen, we could, without any inconvenience, have restored that sum to the Nabob Vizier out of the large cash balances in hand at the close of last year. It would on a demand which you have the means of answering, and which you only forebear to discharge from considerations of your own advantage, cannot be regarded as a weight. The unexpended portion of the Vizier's loan, to the full amount, as I apprehend, of what was to be repaid, formed part of the cash balances. On this statement the having incurred debt to the extent of fifty-four lacks will not appear embarrassment entailed. I trust, my dear Sir, that this mode of clearing the

several points from every intricacy, will enable you to form a sure and conclusive judgement, how far the interests of the Company were duly attended to by me; and you will, no doubt, impart to the Honourable Court the conviction which may be produced in your mind. That I have been successful, is no argument. It is for you to decide, whether success was the consequence rationally to be expected from the measures pursued. Some of the considerations displayed are political, because it is impossible wholly to disjoin such advertences from the higher class of warlike undertakings: as to those references, I venture to believe I have not erred. On what is purely military, I may be indulged in this remark. If professional study can furnish any advantages, it must be in fashioning the mind to discriminate those essential distinctions between situations which ought to prescribe the process to be followed in the particular case; and I imagine it to have been simply a just perception to this nature, which has in various instances surprised bye-standers, with the easy achievement of what to general observation appeared impracticable. In the selections of measures fitted to the special occasion, must lie whatever difference there may be between Commander and Commander. I certainly have not any pretension to prominent skill; yet, on the other hand, I have not to accuse myself of having been negligent, in seeking the attainment of those informations which constitute military science. I have thence a claim to the liberality of the court to this extent, that I shall have credit for exercising in their service an ordinary application of the principles which recorded experience has established, as the foundation of arrangements for the field. It being impossible that those principles should not be familiar to me, an erroneous deviation from them, on my part, could arise only from inconsiderateness or from want of zeal; each inexcusable in a position. Should thus much be allowed to me, it will follow that the conception offered to you by any professional man in England (even if there be no meditated invidiousness in it) is more likely to be in opposite, than the management

which I, actuated by every anxious interest and every possible obligation, have adopted on the spot, as the course most promising for my own reputation and the Company's benefit. By admitting this possibility, the court will forego no right of reprehension, should it be subsequently proved that I had conducted their affairs injudiciously. They would only suspend censure, until it should be demonstrated that I deserved it.

Calcutta  
6th August 1816.

I have, & c.  
(Signed) MOIRA.

## APPENDIX-8

Intercepted Letters of Goorka Officers, (Illustrative of the history of the recent war with Nepal, pp. 3-48).\*

(1) Translation of a letter from Runjore T, happa, Jespow T, happa, Lutchben T, happa, Ryrab Sing Khwas, and Bursore T, happa, to the **Rajah** of Nepal.

The following letter was intercepted at the place of Kangrah, between Calsee and Jytock together with many others; and will serve in some degree to characterise the people, whose production it is. There is a strong mixture of truth contained in it, with much exaggeration, and a sort of imposing tone of moderation and coolness, affecting to treat the success it records as a matter of course, and not as a single instance of good fortune. It is translated almost literally.

“Here it is well. On the day of full moon, on the month **Mangsur**, the 15th of the month, of the week **Somewar**, by the road of the village Chumtron, at the hillock near the enclosure for catching Hyenas, Budul T, happa **Jemmadar**, with 25 men, being the way which leads from Nahn to the temple of the goddess Jumpta, at the temple Suchtee T, happa, **Jemmadar**, and 25 men were placed on picquet on the road leading from Nahn to Jytock, a little underneath the village Kheetan kegoon, which lies below the post at the enclosure for catching tigers. At the second hour after nightfall until the sixth hour, by the Rynka

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Fraser, pp. 520-522.

road, which strikes off from the road leading from Nahn to Kansur, the enemy moved; when having returned to the fort from a review of the outposts, a firing was heard in the dell. The **Jemmadar** sent Purtab Gooroong and Kihen Sing Rawut to report: and they arriving about midnight, were stating the advance of the enemy, whose firing was heard in the hollow of the Jumpta road. The **Jemmadar** returned the fire. Fifty seven loads of ammunition, one petee, and a horse were captured. A soldier arrived about the third watch of the night for people to bring away the captured property. I immediately sent Rumtrumkai **Soubahdar**, with his company, to the Jortee hillock, below Jytock; and Bahadoor Rana, **Jemmadar** of the Goruck battalion, with 25 men and porters to bring off the captured property, which they did. In the meantime a firing was heard at the post of Sachttee T, happa, and I despatched the Hoonoomandhoj and Shamdull companies under Runjeet Khudkha, **Soubahdar**, and Umroop Ghurtee, **Soubahdar**, to the stockade of the Jumpta goddess temple. The firing commenced again there and the post was reinforced by the Burrick Kushadull & Saidooljung companies, under Qazee Jespaw T, happa. The **Qazee** continued in the stockade.

“The companies advanced out of the stockade, having unfurled their colours: 300 Europeans drove them back. Jespaw T, happa, and about 15 or 20 men, remained in the stockade, and all the rest fled on the high land from Jumpta to Jytock. I immediately ordered out the Runbun Kaskee, and a **Soubahdar** of the Goruck battalion, to their support; and they advanced: the Europeans had pushed on & laid hold of the stockade in which Jespaw **Qazee** was defending himself with about 20 men. Runsoor T, happa, Runbun Kaskee, and, the Goruck battalion, **Soubahdar**, gave their fire, and drew their swords: **Quaree** Jespaw also advanced, sword in hand, out of the stockade, and received the enemy's fire. We beat them back to the Jumpta temple, where they stood in a scatterd, confused, body; they kept us a retreating fire in subdivisions, and we

followed the pursuit, the enemy fighting and retreating. We surrounded them on all sides, killed a great many, and drove them completely back; Majors, Captains, Lieutenants, **Soubah-dars**, and men altogether, to the number of a battalion, were killed by musquetry or by the sword; drums, musquets, sword, and all manner of arms, were captured. The contest continued from 3 o'clock in the morning till ten. Our soldiers having dispersed the enemy, returned, and collected under the Jumpta temple.

On the east side of the fort, the Jooladull and Leitchbun Sakee companies were on duty; and Jooladull company had advanced a party of twenty-five men upon the Peacock hill; a battalion of Europeans, and other of native infantry, advanced by the Rynka hill against the Peacock hill. The advanced part of the Jooladull company was driven in, and retreated upon the fort stockades. The hill which the enemy possessed themselves of was almost as high as the fort. The road was even, and the top rather a plain. The enemy showed a post on three sides, and continued prepared for action. I recalled the division from Jumpta, which had defeated the enemy in the morning. They had not time to eat, wash, or refresh themselves, but were hastily given to drink. The Sheamadul and Hoonooman Dhooj company were left in the Jumpta temple stockade; the Nyna Buksh and Bhubso Khuwas companies were posted on the hill below Jytock, towards Nahn. The whole of the Goruck battalion, and the remaining companies, advanced against the Peacock hill, within a stone's throw of the enemy, and commenced the action about mid-day.

The artillery fired upon the enemy from Jytock hill and the hill upon which the Lutchbun Sah company were encamped: three men were killed by the fire. Two hours after nightfall our force drove off the enemy; a close fire of musquetry was exchanged three successive times; and afterwards side-arms were used: until ten at night the conflict continued. The enemy being surrounded, 300 Captains, Lieutenants, and Europeans, and 200 natives, were killed; a

**Soubahdar, Jemmadar**, and forty soldiers taken prisoners. Many stand of arms and other plunder was taken.

The field of battle was plain, and the enemy fought bravely, with their breasts a rampart. The musquetry crossed the conflict, and the fire of the opposing combatants mixed; we have lost **Soubahdars** and officers both killed and wounded. The city of Nahn would have been destroyed by artillery, and our force was small, and not able to defend it; it was therefore judged expedient to retire upon Jytock. My father and the superior officers directed this measure. Nahn was left empty, and the British army took possession of it. In the battle of Jumpta, Bahadoor Rana was the first man who drew his sword, and distinguished himself; he is a **Jemmadar** in the Goruck battalion to the eastward: in the action of the Peacock hill, Deechurd Kheeoas of the same was the foremost in valour.

(2) From Ummr Sing and his sons, Ram Dass and Urjeen T, happa, to the **Rajah** of Nepal, dated Rajgruh, 2nd March, 1815.

The following very energetic, original, and excellent letter was intercepted in the course of our progress in Almorah, together with many others both in original and duplicate. It may well be considered a very valuable and interesting document; showing the policy of the Nepal Government and of its chief with regard the British Government; and exhibiting a strong characteristic picture of our enemy and chief opponent, Ummr Sing T, happa. The gallantry, patriotism, and nobleness of his sentiments cannot be too much admired; while the acuteness of his reasoning, though not founded on the liberal policy which actuates British councils, and which no Asiatic understands, is also worthy of attention. I deem myself fortunate in the liberal permission I have obtained from Government, to add to this interesting document to these notes. (For details see Fraser, pp. 522-526).

## APPENDIX-9

Translation of a Draft of a Petition to be addressed to the Emperor of China, by the **Rajah** of Nepal, enclosed in Ummr Singh's letter from Raj Gurh, dated 2nd of March, 1815.\*

“I yield obedience to the Emperor of China, and no one dare invade my dominions; or, if any power has ventured to encroach on my territory through your favour and protection, I have been able to discomfit and expel them. Now, however, a powerful and inveterate enemy has attacked me, and as I owe allegiance to you, I rely on obtaining your assistance and support. From Khunka to the Sutlej, for a thousand **cos**, war is waging between us. Entertaining designs of Bhote (Tartary) the enemy endeavours to get possession of Nepal; and for these objects he has formented a quarrel, and declared war. Five or six great actions have already been fought; but, through the fortune and glory of your Imperial Majesty, I have succeeded in destroying about 20,000 of the enemy.

“But his wealth and military resources are great, and he sustains the loss without receding a step. On the contrary, numerous reinforcements continue to arrive, and my country is invaded at all points. Though I might obtain a hundred thousand soldiers from the hills and plains, yet without pay they cannot be maintained; and though I have every desire to pay them, I have not the means.

“Without soliders I cannot repel the enemy. Consider the Ghoorkhas as your tributaries; reflect that the English came to conquer Nepal and Bhote; and for

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\*Fraser, pp. 526-527.

these reasons be graciously pleased to assist us with a sum of money, that we may levy an army, and drive forth the invaders; or if you are unwilling to assist us with subsidies, and prefer sending an army to our aid, it's well.

“The climate of Dhurma is temperate; and you may easily send an army of 2 or 300,000 men, by the route of Dhurma into Bengal, spreading alarm and consternation among the European as far as Calcutta. The enemy has subjugated all the **rajah** of the plains, and usurped the throne of the King of Delhi; and, therefore, it is to be expected that these would all unite in expelling Europeans from Hindustan. By such an event your name will be renowned throughout Jumboo Dweep; and whenever you may command, the whole of its inhabitants will be forward in your service. Should you think that the conquest of Nepal, and the forcible separation of the Ghoorkhas from their dependence on the Emperor of China, cannot materially affect your Majesty's interests, I beseech you to reflect that, without your aid, I cannot repulse the English; that, these are the people who have already subdued all India, and usurped the throne of Delhi; that, with my army and resources, I am quite unable to make head against them; and that the world will henceforth say, that the Emperor of China abandoned to their fate his tributaries and dependents. I acknowledge the supremacy of the Emperor China above all other potentates on earth. The English, after obtaining possession of Nepal, will advance by the routes of Buddrinhaut and Mansarobar, and also by that of Diggurcheh, for the purpose of conquering Lassa. I beg, therefore, that you will write an order to the English, directing them to withdraw their forces from the territory of the Goorkha state, which is tributary and dependent on you, otherwise you will send an army to our aid. I beseech you, however, to lose no time in sending assistance, whether in men or money, that I may drive forth the enemy, and maintain possession of the mountains, otherwise, in a few years, he will be master of Lassa.”

## APPENDIX-10

Letter from Ummer Sing T, happa (his son), to Kagee Bohtawin Sing Bishnaut, dated 6th of Phagoon (2nd of March, 1815).\*

“Runjore Singh T, happa will have informed you of the victory gained at Jytock. There have been two trifling battles fought here: many of the English were killed. The rajah in this country has joined the English and surrounded me. I had determined to fight the enemy with the force I had with me, notwithstanding it was putting every thing to the hazard (a game of chance); victory and defeat are in the hands of the Diety; when I was informed by the government at Nepal, that a reinforcement of 27 companies had been sent off, & Bum Sah Chowtra wrote to me that they already had arrived at Bhootana (Pintana, about halfway between Almorah and Nepal), and would speedily join me. I therefore, waited for their arrival and junction before I attacked the enemy. The English army is posted in stockaded positions. I have received orders from the government if possible to effect a peace, by sacrificing a portion of the country; but, instead of being satisfied with a part, the English aim at possessing the whole extent of the mountains to Nepal, and have created a disturbance from the Kamuck Tishtee (near Nepal), to the Saturrooda (probably the Sutudra, or Sutlej). Should I open any negotiation for peace, or make offers of a cession of a portion of the country, the same thing will occur as happened to Tippoo.

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\*Fraser, pp, 527-528.

who during war time, gave to them three crores of **Jaidad** (lands held for military service), & made peace. In the end, they possessed themselves of the whole of his dominions; in a similar manner they will take a part of this country; and extending, they will eventually seize upon Nepal itself.

“It is not my opinion, therefore, that it would be advisable to make peace with the English, by the cession of any part of the country. I would rather advise that, if possible, it be defended by force of arms, & every means of opposition. You have done well in collecting the companies, defending the Gurwhal country. It is your duty thus to do service to your master, who will show his approbation, and reward you.

“If I could gain a victory or two over the enemy, the Sikhs would come to my assistance, and with their co-operation we would drive the English from the country, and rid the land of its enemies. Be urgent with the armies that may have arrived from the eastward to join me without delay, and keep me informed from time to time of your welfare and affairs.”



# ERRATA

Page Nos.	Line	Incorrect	Correct
c	12	37	36
4	6	Engilsh	English
4	27	estmated	estimated
4	30	..	..
5	20	succeded	succeeded
5	35	Singh	Singha
6	12	begining	beginning
6	32	Rajhas	Rajahs
7	1	Klng	King
7	4	Durlng	During
8	24	theEnglish	the English
8	24	too 'did	too, did
8	31	unvelling	unveiling
9	29	Rajha	Rajah
10	7	In	in
10	10	Rajha's	Rajah's
10	12	Rajha's	Rajah's
10	14	Rajha	Rajah
10	16	Rajha's	Rajah's
10	33	Khan	Khaun
10	33	with some	with him some
11	7	Rajha's	Rajah's
11	9	Rajha	Rajah
11	12	Otherswise	Otherwise
11	16	Rajha	Rajah
12	21	to hills	to the hills
12	32	Girwan	Girbana
13	8	Girban	Girbana
13	19	Maharaai	Maharani
14-15	36 & 1	strengthenaing	strengthening
15	19	oblivous	oblivious
17	18	Konx	Knox

18	15	successful	successful.
19	15	dissloved	dissolved
19	26	Youdha	Yuddha
20	3	1923	1929
20	4	wrtie	writes
20	27	Sankhu,	Sakhu,
22	32	Ibid	Ibid.
23	25	Parbattiha	Parbattiah
27	7	D. B.	B. D.
27	18	unprooked	unprovoked
28	21	perferred	preferred
28	24	neignbours	neighbours
29	23	handedly,	handed .
32	22	emphais	emphasis
37	6-7	declrparation	declaration
38	11	MIP,	MIH,
39	4	faithfulallies	faithful allies
39	9	auhorities	authorities
40	17	560	460
40	20	for	For
42	4	Ludhiyana	Ludhiana
43	16	hastly	hasty
44	7	Singn	Singh
44	9	reinforcement"12	reinforcement."12
44	13	seize "	seize "
48	15	Portion	portion
48	23	Gadh	Garh
48	27	Ramgadh	Ramgarh
48	28	Ramgadh	Ramgarh
48	29	enagged	engaged
48	31	Ramgadh	Ramgarh
49	2	Ramgadh	Ramgarh
50	15	recpect	respect
53	29	was	were
53	32	was sufficient	was not sufficient
56	1	Chanda	Chand
57	14	8,00;	8,000;
58	10	killed	killed;

58	20	slain	slain,
59	37	23	22
60	23	62	63
60	35	Rifles	Rifles
60	37	Army	Army,
61	4	Victory	victory
61	6	Nepalese	Nepalese.
61	20	god,	God,
62	2	Cousion	Cousin
62	11	ungrateful	ungrateful,
65	13	the“ Treaty	the Treaty
66	7	TREATRY	TREATY
69	1	o	to
76	21-22	only check	only to check
78	12	was	war
78	22	Last	last
80	11-12	father both	father, both
80	16	Rajpoot	Rajpoot.
81	13	indicates the	indicates that the
82	25-26	Goruckpur.	Goruckpur,
83	5	1819,	1819.
83	7	Nepal:	Nepal;
83	12	2021,	2022,
83	20	London	Landon
84	22	Garratt	Garratt.
86	33	qualification	qualification.
90	21-22	following, persons	following ins- talments..... The following ↗
90	32	American	American
91	30	countries	countries;
91	33	fo	of
91	33	introduction	introducing
92	2	however, to be	however, be/
92	31	Camp.	Camp,
93	7	Singh	Sing
93	25	alarm Rajah,	alarm the Rajah,

94	5	well	well
94	20	recommened	recommended
95	1	Singh	Sing
95	5	pro <del>h</del> ession	possession.
95	8	Singh	Sing
95	9	Singh	Sing
95	12	Singh	Sing
95	29	Coss	Coss
96	7	1871	1871,
96	14	between ancestors	between my ancestors
98	16	you	your
99	35	contemplate	contemplated
100	7	when	when,
101	24	success,	success.
102	18	Divison	Division
103	3	or	of
103	9	much	must
103	16	dip	keep
108	13	it	its
109	11	than	that
110	6-7	Nepal	Nepaul
111	23	determination	determination;
112	6-7	of the October 13th, 1815 that	of the 13th October 1815, that
115	9	Thannander	Thannadar
116	26	of war	of the war
116	29	makes, it	makes it
117	1	to Board.	to the Board.
117	21	1815 declares	1815, declares
118	13	desable	disable
118	19	regulate by	regulate the details by
118	29	to enemy's to the capital	to the enemy's capital
119	35	extent, of surface was	extent of surface, was

120	8	at it.	at it,
120	27	nations	notions
120	27	force which	force, which
121	6	divison	division
124	19	achievment	achievement
128	33	nightfal	nightfall
129	19	Rajgruh	Rajgurb
132	4	Singh	Sing
133	11	Gurwhal	Gurhwal